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NOT QUITE WHAT THE DOCTOR ORDERED: THE THIRD CIRCUIT
PULLS THE PLUG ON OBJECTIVE FALSITY IN UNITED
STATES EX REL. DRUDING V. CARE
ALTERNATIVES
JENNA L. SCHAFFER*
“[T]here is no kind of dishonesty into which otherwise good people more easily and frequently fall, than that of defrauding [the]
government . . . .”1
I. MAKING

THE

FIRST INCISION: AN INTRODUCTION

The medical profession was once regarded as the embodiment of altruism and incorruptibility—but not anymore.2 Rampant health care
fraud across the United States has taught federal law enforcement that
even otherwise good doctors are capable of defrauding the government.3
Out of necessity, medical providers have become intimately familiar with
the government’s primary recovery instrument to combat fraud—the False
* J.D. Candidate, 2022, Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law;
B.B.A., magna cum laude, 2014, Temple University. I dedicate this Note to three
incredible individuals: (1) my mom, Beth Brady, who has always believed in me
and who taught me that even a seemingly insurmountable task can be
accomplished if it is done one step at a time; (2) my fiancé, Matt Guarino, who
selflessly supports my professional goals and always finds a way to make me laugh;
and lastly, (3) Michel Verleysen, who showers me with optimism and never lets me
lose sight of my dreams. Mom, Matt, and Michel—thank you for your endless love
and unwavering support. I would also like to thank Charles Widger for his
invaluable mentorship and Professor Michael Campbell for his thoughtful critique
of this Note. And finally, I would like to recognize my Villanova Law Review
colleagues for their hard work throughout the editing and publication of this
Note.
1. Letter from Benjamin Franklin to the Printer of the London Chronicle
(Nov. 24, 1767), in 14 THE PAPERS OF BENJAMIN FRANKLIN 315, 315–19 (Leonard W.
Labaree & Yale Univ. Press eds., 1970) (describing the negative effect fraud has on
the nation’s treasury).
2. See James F. Sweeney, The Eroding Trust Between Patients and Physicians, MED.
ECON. (Apr. 10, 2018), https://www.medicaleconomics.com/view/eroding-trustbetween-patients-and-physicians [https://perma.cc/58JS-GTU2] (explaining why
the doctor-patient relationship has eroded over time and suggesting several methods to get the relationship back on track).
3. Cf. Nick Oberheiden, I’ve Been Indicted on Healthcare Fraud Charges—Now
What?, NAT’L L. REV. (Oct. 27, 2020), https://www.natlawreview.com/article/i-vebeen-indicted-healthcare-fraud-charges-now-what [https://perma.cc/MY5P-8V6V]
(identifying several examples of health care fraud and noting how the concept of
health care fraud is broad and therefore, encompasses a lot of activity).

(167)
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Claims Act (“FCA”).4 Although Congress originally created the FCA to
excise wartime profiteering, the FCA’s broad scope has allowed it to endure for more than 150 years and remain applicable across a wide breadth
of industries.5 Over time, the FCA has developed a reputation for its punitive penalties and qui tam provisions, which enable private whistleblowers
to pursue FCA litigation on behalf of the government.6
Despite its age, the FCA’s popularity is a more recent phenomenon.7
In an effort to encourage qui tam claims, Congress amended the FCA in
1986 by lowering the burden of proof for plaintiffs, raising penalties, increasing maximum awards available to qui tam claimants, and adding antiretaliation provisions.8 In 2009 and 2010, Congress demonstrated its continued commitment to combatting fraud by passing back-to-back FCA
amendments that once again expanded the Act’s reach.9 As a result of
4. See Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Justice Department Recovers Over $2.8
Billion from False Claims Act Cases in Fiscal Year 2018 (Dec. 21, 2018), https://
www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-recovers-over-28-billion-false-claimsact-cases-fiscal-year-2018 [https://perma.cc/H3JY-Z8TZ] [hereinafter Justice Department Recovers Over $2.8 Billion in 2018] (identifying various industries the
FCA polices, including defense, national security, and import tariffs); see also 31
U.S.C. § 3729 (2021) (codifying the FCA).
5. See United States v. Neifert-White Co., 390 U.S. 228, 232 (1968) (explaining
debates surrounding FCA’s enactment indicate it “was intended to reach all types
of fraud, without qualification”); see also Melissa E. Najjar, When Medical Opinions,
Judgments, and Conclusions Are “False” Under the False Claims Act: Criminal and Civil
Liability of Physicians Who Are Second-Guessed by the Government, 53 SUFFOLK U. L. REV.
137, 140 (2020) (explaining that Congress’ broad drafting of the FCA enables the
law to endure); cf. Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Justice Department Recovers
Over $3 Billion from False Claims Act Cases in Fiscal Year 2019 (Jan. 9, 2020),
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-recovers-over-3-billion-falseclaims-act-cases-fiscal-year-2019 [https://perma.cc/KGZ2-VRN6] [hereinafter Justice Department Recovers Over $3 Billion in 2019] (“The number and variety of
judgments and settlements announced during fiscal year 2019 reflect the diversity
of fraud recoveries arising under the [FCA].”).
6. See Universal Health Servs. v. United States ex rel. Escobar, 579 U.S. 176, 182
(2016) (“Congress . . . has increased the Act’s civil penalties so that liability is
‘essentially punitive in nature.’ ” (quoting Vermont Agency of Nat. Res. v. United
States ex rel. Stevens, 529 U.S. 765, 784 (2000))); Winter ex rel. United States v.
Gardens Reg’l Hosp. & Med. Ctr., 953 F.3d 1108, 1114 (9th Cir. 2020) (commenting that liability imposed by the FCA is “significant”); see Vincent A. Recca, Healthcare’s Ticking Time Bomb: The 60-Day Rule and Kane, 44 AM. J. CRIM. L. 239, 243
(2017) (noting that “qui tam” is derived from “the Latin phrase, ‘qui tam pro domino
rege quam pro se ipso in hac parte sequitur, which translates to who brings the action
for the king as well as himself’ ” (quoting ROBIN PAGE WEST, ADVISING THE QUI TAM
WHISTLEBLOWER: FROM IDENTIFYING A CASE TO FILING UNDER THE FALSE CLAIMS ACT
2 (2nd ed. 2009))).
7. See Justice Department Recovers Over $3 Billion in 2019, supra note 5 (“Recoveries since 1986, when Congress substantially strengthened the civil [FCA], now
total more than $62 billion.”).
8. See id. (explaining FCA was strengthened in 1986 when incentives for
whistleblowers to bring lawsuits increased).
9. See James J. Belanger & Scott M. Bennett, The Continued Expansion of the
False Claims Act, 4 J. HEALTH & LIFE SCI. L. 26, 29–35 (2010). Congress passed the
Fraud Enforcement and Recovery Act (“FERA”) in 2009 and the Patient Protection
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these amendments, the number of FCA claims has been on the rise—with
health care fraud being the main target.10
As health care costs continue to rise at an unprecedented rate, so
does the capacity for fraud.11 The federal government is the single largest
health care payer in the country, allocating more than a quarter of its
annual budget to health care expenditures.12 In 2019 alone, the federal
government spent more than a trillion dollars on health care goods and
services.13 The Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (“CMS”) project that over the next ten years, the annual growth of health care spending will outpace the annual growth of domestic product, with national
health care spending reaching $6.2 trillion by 2028.14 It is estimated that
up to ten percent of federal health care spending is due to fraudulent
activity—meaning that health care fraud costs taxpayers billions of dollars
each year.15 With health care costs poised to increase at an unsustainable
and Affordable Care Act (“PPACA” or “ACA”) in 2010, both of which extended the
FCA’s reach once again. See id. (same); see also Kamal Al-Salihi, Keeping It Simple:
Finding Falsity Under the False Claims Act, 36 WHITTIER L. REV. 431, 443 (2015)
(describing 2009 FCA amendments as changes that allowed the FCA to expand its
reach to “almost all recipients of federal program funds”).
10. See Patricia Meador & Elizabeth S. Warren, The False Claims Act: A Civil War
Relic Evolves into A Modern Weapon, 65 TENN. L. REV. 455, 456 (1998) (“In recent
years, the government has . . . turn[ed] a dated law into a modern nightmare for
the health care industry.”); see also Najjar, supra note 5, at 140 (noting the FCA has
increasingly been employed to combat both Medicare and Medicaid fraud).
11. See CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., FINANCIAL REPORT 24 (2019),
https://www.cms.gov/files/document/cms-financial-report-fiscal-year-2019.pdf
[https://perma.cc/J2Z3-3UZT] [hereinafter CMS 2019 FINANCIAL REPORT]
(“[T]he American healthcare system is on an unsustainable trajectory, with one in
five dollars spent in our economy projected to be spent on healthcare by 2026.”);
see also Nicole Forbes Stowell, Carl Pacini, Nathan Wadlinger, Jacqueline M. Crain
& Martina Schmidt, Investigating Healthcare Fraud: Its Scope, Applicable Laws, and Regulations, 11 WM. & MARY BUS. L. REV. 479, 479 (2020) (explaining that “clever
fraudsters view the healthcare industry as a lucrative and attractive hotspot for illegal activity”); Recca, supra note 6, at 241 (noting that because of Medicare and
Medicaid’s combined “cost, dizzying complexity, and national reach, there is tremendous potential for mistakes, fraud, and abuse”).
12. See Where Do Our Federal Tax Dollars Go?, CTR. ON BUDGET & POL’Y PRIORITIES (Apr. 9, 2020), https://www.cbpp.org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/4-1408tax.pdf [https://perma.cc/HW23-ZG97] (explaining Medicare, Medicaid, the
Children’s Health Insurance Program, and the Affordable Care Act marketplace
subsidies accounted for twenty-five percent of 2019 budget).
13. See CMS 2019 FINANCIAL REPORT, supra note 11, at 3 (releasing financial
statements that show nearly $1.1 trillion spent on health care in fiscal year 2019, up
nearly eight percent since fiscal year 2018).
14. See CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., NHE PROJECTIONS
2019–2028–TABLES: TABLE 01 NATIONAL HEALTH EXPENDITURES AND SELECTED ECONOMIC INDICATORS, https://www.cms.gov/Research-Statistics-Data-and-Systems/Statistics-Trends-and-Reports/NationalHealthExpendData/
NationalHealthAccountsProjected [https://perma.cc/FJ9P-SWEY] (projecting
health care spend increases through 2028 based on data through 2018).
15. See Lauren E. Davis, Growing Health Care Fraud Drastically Affects All of Us,
ASS’N CERTIFIED FRAUD EXAM’RS (2012), https://www.acfe.com/article.aspx?id=
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rate, the government has prioritized health care fraud prevention and recovery in an effort to control rising health care costs.16
As the COVID-19 pandemic subsides, FCA litigation is anticipated to
increase.17 On March 27, 2020, Congress swiftly passed the Coronavirus
Aid, Relief, and Economic Security (“CARES”) Act, which established the
Provider Relief Fund, dedicating $175 billion for health care providers to
“prevent, prepare for, and respond” to the COVID-19 pandemic.18 History has proven that during a national crisis—such as the Civil War or
Hurricane Katrina—fraudsters take advantage of relief funding.19 Understanding this, the government is preparing to “vigorously pursue fraud”
resulting from the pandemic.20
The uptick in litigation has and will continue to expose ambiguities in
the FCA.21 Unlike other elements of the FCA, the falsity element is not
statutorily defined and, as a result, considerable judicial ink is spilled over
its interpretation.22 A budding circuit split—or rather, what has been perceived as a circuit split—exemplifies falsity’s elusiveness by examining
whether a physician’s clinical judgment can be considered false under the
4294974475 [https://perma.cc/YMP3-A7N5] (estimating health care fraud accounts for three to ten percent of total health care expenditures).
16. See Meador & Warren, supra note 10, at 455 (“The United States Department of Justice has listed health care fraud as a priority, second only to violent
crime.”).
17. See Ethan P. Davis, Principal Deputy Assistant Att’y Gen., Remarks on
False Claims Act at U.S. Chamber of Com. Inst. for Legal Reform (Jun. 26, 2020)
(discussing COVID-19 relief funding and noting the funding is “a lot of money,
and it creates a number of opportunities for fraud”); see also Richard Schroeder,
Daniel J. Martin & Michael J. O’Brien, In Coronavirus-Recovery, Haste Makes . . .
Fraud, Waste, and Abuse? Managing False Claims Act Compliance Risk in the COVID-19
Crisis, NAT’L L. REV. (Apr. 9, 2020), https://www.natlawreview.com/article/
coronavirus-recovery-haste-makes-fraud-waste-and-abuse-managing-false-claims-act
[https://perma.cc/P4VB-DSST] (“With great crises comes great compliance
risk.”).
18. See Coronavirus Aid, Relief, & Economic Security Act, Pub. L. No. 116-136,
134 Stat. 281 (2020) (outlining the parameters of government relief during the
COVID-19 pandemic). To combat the expected fraud, the CARES Act established
the Office of the Special Inspector General for Pandemic Recovery to lead the
fraud detection efforts. See id.
19. See Rebecca M. Ricigliano, David Robbins, Byron R. Brown & Tiffany
Wynn, The CARES Act and Lessons from the Past: What Prior Investigative Responses to
Crises Tell Us About the Future, WESTLAW PRACS. INSIGHTS & COMMENTARIES (Apr. 27,
2020), https://www.crowell.com/files/20200427-CARES-Act-and-Lessons-Fromthe-Past-Update.pdf [https://perma.cc/R55Y-BEMU] (relating relief provided
during COVID-19 pandemic to relief provided during hurricanes).
20. See Davis, supra note 17 (“[W]hile we will vigorously pursue fraud and
other illegal activity, we also respect the critical role that the private sector is playing in helping to bring an end to the pandemic and in restarting our economy.”).
21. See Meador & Warren, supra note 10, at 456 (“The aggressive use of the
[FCA] in the health care industry has highlighted problems in its interpretation.”).
22. See 31 U.S.C. § 3729(b) (2021) (defining other FCA elements—but not
falsity).
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FCA based on a showing of contradictory expert opinion.23 In United
States ex rel. Druding v. Care Alternatives,24 the Third Circuit answered this
question with a “straightforward yes.”25
This Note discusses the Third Circuit’s analysis in Druding and suggests that the court’s imprecise interpretation and flat rejection of the
Eleventh Circuit’s falsity standard created the perception of a circuit
split—even though a split may not actually exist.26 Further, this Note argues that the Third Circuit created unnecessary confusion for future cases
by failing to (1) replace the falsity standard it rejected and (2) redirect the
lower court to the appropriate FCA element—in this case, knowledge,
rather than falsity.27 Nonetheless, this Note demonstrates that despite the
opinion’s shortcomings, the Third Circuit had substantial reason to
reverse.28
To introduce the area of health care fraud that this Note focuses on,
Part II discusses hospice fraud and the Medicare Hospice Benefit
(“MHB”). After laying the foundation for hospice fraud, Part III examines
the government’s main tool in combatting fraud—the FCA. Part IV introduces the so-called circuit split by discussing the Eleventh Circuit’s decision in United States v. AseraCare, Inc.29 and the Ninth Circuit’s opinion in
Winter ex rel. United States v. Gardens Regional Hospital and Medical Center.30
Part V lays out Druding’s facts and procedural history. Part VI summarizes
the Third Circuit’s holding and reasoning in Druding. Part VII critically
analyzes the issues in Druding. Finally, Part VIII discusses the likely impact
of Druding.
II. THE MEDICARE HOSPICE BENEFIT: INFECTED

WITH

FRAUD

Dedicated to palliative care for terminally ill patients, the hospice industry has benefited from increased utilization and heightened societal
acceptance of hospice services over the last few decades.31 When patients
23. See United States ex rel. Druding v. Care Alts., 952 F.3d 89, 100 (3d Cir.
2020) (rejecting objective falsity standard).
24. Id.
25. Id. at 95 (recognizing question on appeal as “whether a hospice-care provider’s claim for reimbursement can be considered ‘false’ under the FCA” and
explaining “[t]he answer is a straightforward yes”).
26. See Part VII infra.
27. For an analysis of Druding, see Part VII infra.
28. For a more complete critical analysis of Druding, see Part VII infra.
29. 938 F.3d 1278 (11th Cir. 2019).
30. 953 F.3d 1108 (9th Cir. 2020).
31. See 42 C.F.R. § 418.3 (2019) (defining hospice care); see also United States
ex rel. Druding v. Care Alts., 952 F.3d 89, 92 (3d Cir. 2020) (noting the Medical
Hospice Benefit was enacted in 1983); see also CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID
SERVS., MEDICARE HOSPICE BENEFITS (2020), https://www.medicare.gov/Pubs/pdf/
02154-Medicare-Hospice-Benefits.pdf [https://perma.cc/B6BB-R8NG] (explaining hospice services may include physical care, counseling, prescription drugs,
equipment, and supplies for the terminal illness and related conditions); see also
Isaac D. Buck, A Farewell to Falsity Shifting Standards in Medicare Fraud Enforcement, 49
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elect to enroll in hospice, they agree to receive palliative care—treatment
focused on pain relief only—and to forgo curative treatment of their terminal illness.32
CMS is part of the Department of Health and Human Services
(“HHS”) and is the primary payer for hospice services through its hospice
benefit, which is referred to as the MHB”.33 The MHB covers services that
are (1) offered by Medicare-certified hospice providers and (2) reasonable
and necessary for the palliation and management of a Medicare beneficiary’s terminal illness.34 If a service qualifies, Medicare pays the hospice a
daily rate for each day the patient is enrolled in hospice—regardless of
how much it actually costs to care for the patient.35 This fee-for-service
payment model has been criticized for its inadvertent incentivize to
overbill Medicare by lengthening a patient’s stay—because the longer a
patient is on hospice, the more money the provider makes.36
Without a limit on the number of days a patient may be enrolled in
hospice benefits, average lengths of stay have been on the rise as more
hospice providers enter the market.37 Medicare provides eligible hospice
patients with two ninety-day benefit periods, followed by an unlimited
number of sixty-day benefit periods.38 Without a cap on the amount of
time a patient can be on hospice, some patients are on hospice for years.39
SETON HALL L. REV. 1, 10 (2018) (recognizing hospice care’s soaring popularity
has been, in part, due to increasing societal acceptance).
32. See Kathy L. Cerminara, Hospice and Health Care Reform: Improving Care at
the End of Life, 17 WIDENER L. REV. 443, 449 (2011) (noting positive aspects of
hospice care not only for terminally ill patients but their families as well).
33. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395c (2021) (noting Medicare provides basic health insurance for individuals who are at least age sixty-five, disabled, or suffering from
end-stage renal disease); see also CMS 2019 FINANCIAL REPORT, supra note 11, at 2
(describing the history of HHS and CMS).
34. See 42 C.F.R. § 418.1 (2009) (codifying regulation imposed on hospice
providers).
35. See 42 C.F.R. § 418.302 (2015) (describing the payment procedures for
hospice care).
36. See, e.g., Meador & Warren, supra note 10, at 470 (“Overutilization occurs
when a provider orders or performs medically unnecessary tests and services.
Many parts of the Medicare system restrict the price paid per service, but do not
limit the quantity of services provided, producing an incentive for overutilization.”); cf. Stowell et. al., supra note 11, at 484 (pointing out that overbilling may be
harder to detect then for example, a double-billing error).
37. See Cerminara, supra note 32, at 462 (“[T]he mere incorporation of a hospice as a for-profit entity . . . tends to raise concerns that the hospice is focused on
maximizing profits, perhaps above other goals.”).
38. 42 U.S.C. § 1395f(a)(7)(A) (2021) (discussing conditions of and limitations on payment for services); 42 C.F.R. § 418.21(a) (2006) (describing the duration of hospice care coverage).
39. See Cerminara, supra note 32, at 448 (acknowledging that some hospice
patients are on hospice for years because they are consistently recertified). Compare 42 C.F.R. § 418.309 (2018) (outlining an aggregate cap for Medicare payments to hospice providers), with MEDICARE PAYMENT ADVISORY COMM., REPORT TO
CONGRESS: MEDICARE PAYMENT POLICY 325 (2020) https://www.medpac.gov/wpcontent/uploads/import_data/scrape_files/docs/default-source/reports/
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As Medicare’s budget for hospice services swells and the number of
hospice providers continues to rise, so does the number of qui tam claimants blowing the whistle on hospice fraud.40 Between 2000 and 2017,
MHB utilization increased 28%, spending increased 400%, and the average length of stay increased 66%.41 The hospice industry’s rapid growth,
relatively high provider profit margins, and subjective terminal illness certifications, has raised concerns that claims are being submitted for patients
who are not actually near death.42
In an effort to reduce fraudulent activity, Medicare payment is conditioned on a provider’s compliance with numerous regulatory requirements.43 Hospice fraud—arguably the latest epicenter of FCA litigation—
has brought several regulatory requirements into focus, including that: (1)
services rendered must be “reasonable and necessary,” (2) a physician
must “certify . . . that a [patient is] terminally ill,” and (3) the physician’s
certification must be supported with documentation.44
mar20_entirereport_sec.pdf [https://perma.cc/B9FY-UXJF] (presenting data
gathered by MedPAC to support recommendation to Congress that the hospice
aggregate cap should be reduced by twenty percent).
40. NAT’L HOSPICE & PALLIATIVE CARE ORG., NHPCO FACTS & FIGURES 2020
EDITION 18 (2020), https://www.nhpco.org/wp-content/uploads/NHPCO-FactsFigures-2020-edition.pdf [https://perma.cc/7HS8-PZG4] (noting that hospice services account for $19.2 billion of Medicare’s 2018 budget); see also Buck, supra note
31, at 9–10 (highlighting that the MHB is a quickly growing portion of Medicare’s
budget and as a result, hospice fraud has become the focus of many FCA cases).
41. See MEDICARE PAYMENT ADVISORY COMM., REPORT TO CONGRESS: MEDICARE
PAYMENT POLICY 311-13, 316-17, 319 (2019), https://www.medpac.gov/wp-content/uploads/import_data/scrape_files/docs/default-source/reports/
mar19_medpac_entirereport_sec_rev.pdf [https://perma.cc/P8A4-TEQX] (indicating that the MHB utilization increased from 22.9% in 2000 to 50.4% in 2017,
spending increased from $2.9 billion in 2000 to $17.9 billion in 2017, and average
length of stay among decedents increased from 53.5 days in 2000 to 88.6 days in
2017).
42. See id. (“For hospice providers, Medicare payments exceeded marginal
costs by roughly [fourteen] percent in 2016, suggesting that providers have an
incentive to treat Medicare patients.”). See also Buck, supra note 31, at 13 (“The
booming business of Medicare’s hospice benefit has raised questions about the
costly incentives that exist within it.”); Cerminara, supra note 32, at 459 (pointing
to the tighter controls Congress placed on hospice recertifications in 2011 in support of the argument that Congress “revealed some distrust of hospices” through
its legislative activities).
43. See Cerminara, supra note 32, at 459-60 (explaining that MedPAC—an entity created to advise CMS—expressed concern “regarding the potential for fraud
and abuse among for-profit hospices” and as a result, CMS revised some of its
regulations); see generally SUZANNE MURRIN, HOSPICES SHOULD IMPROVE THEIR ELECTION STATEMENTS AND CERTIFICATIONS OF TERMINAL ILLNESS 1–2 (2016), https://
www.oversight.gov/sites/default/files/oig-reports/oei-02-10-00492.pdf [https://
perma.cc/KDW2-FAPF] (citing several recent cases involving hospice fraud).
44. 42 U.S.C. § 1395y(a)(1)(C) (2021) (noting the medical necessity requirement for hospice services); 42 U.S.C. § 1395f(a)(7)(A)(i) (2021) (requiring a patient to be certified as terminally ill under the MHB); see 42 C.F.R. § 418.22(b)(2)
(2020) (mandating that a terminally ill certification be supported by
documentation).
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First, for a claim to be reimbursable under Medicare, the services rendered must be “reasonable and necessary” when benchmarked against acceptable medical standards.45 This requirement spans beyond the MHB,
to all Medicare-reimbursable claims.46 To determine what is reasonable
and necessary, CMS suggests considering several factors, including
whether the services are (1) “appropriate” in terms of “duration and frequency,” (2) “furnished in accordance with accepted medical standards,”
and (3) not excessive in terms of “the patient’s medical need.”47
Next, a Medicare beneficiary is eligible for hospice benefits if their
attending physician and the hospice medical director certify that they are
“terminally ill.”48 To be considered terminally ill, a patient must have “a
medical prognosis that [their] life expectancy is [six] months or less” if
the “illness runs its normal course.”49 While physicians have latitude when
determining someone’s life expectancy, they do not have “unfettered discretion[.]”50 Recognizing the difficulty in estimating life expectancy, CMS
admits that “making a prognosis is not an exact science.”51 Nonetheless,
CMS puts boundaries around a physician’s discretion by requiring a
clinical basis for certification.52
45. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395y(a)(1)(C) (explaining that for hospice services to be
covered under Medicare, they must be “reasonable and necessary for the palliation
or management of [the patient’s] terminal illness”).
46. See id. § 1395y(a)(1) (identifying the medical necessity requirement as it
relates to services reimbursable under Medicare).
47. CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., MEDICARE PROGRAM INTEGRITY
MANUAL § 13.5.4 (2019), https://www.cms.gov/Regulations-and-Guidance/Guidance/Manuals/Downloads/pim83c13.pdf [https://perma.cc/3Q7U-7DJ9] (summarizing guidance regarding local coverage determinations).
48. 42 U.S.C. § 1395f(a)(7)(A)(i) (describing the terminally ill certification
required during the first ninety-day period of a patient’s hospice stay); see id.
§ 1395f(a)(7)(A)(ii) (explaining that after being initially certified as terminally ill,
a patient must be re-certified each benefit period).
49. 42 U.S.C. § 1395x(dd)(3)(A) (defining terminally ill); 42 C.F.R. § 418.3
(2019) (defining terminally ill).
50. Winter ex rel. United States v. Gardens Reg’l Hosp. & Med. Ctr., 953 F.3d
1108, 1114 (9th Cir. 2020) (citing 42 C.F.R. § 412.3(d)(1) (2018)) (“The Medicare
program trusts doctors to use their clinical judgment based on ‘complex medical
factors,’ but does not give them unfettered discretion to decide whether inpatient
admission is medically necessary . . . .”).
51. Medicare Program; FY 2015 Hospice Wage Index & Payment Rate Update, 79 Fed. Reg. 50,452, 50,470 (Aug. 22, 2014) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pt.
405, 418) (explaining that CMS understands “that the rate of live discharges
should not be zero, given the uncertainties of prognostication.”); see generally
Brown v. United States, 737 Fed. Appx. 777, 780-81 (7th Cir. 2018) (reviewing a
negligence claim, explaining that “medicine is an inexact science” (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Ross v. Olson, 825 N.E.2d 890, 893 (Ind. Ct. App.
2005))).
52. See Medicare Program, FY 2015 Hospice Wage Index & Payment Rate Update, 79 Fed. Reg. at 50,470 (“The certification is based on a clinical judgment
regarding the usual course of a terminal illness, and recognizes the fact that making medical prognostications regarding life expectancy is not exact. However, . . .
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Finally, a terminally ill prognosis must be tethered to a patient’s medical records.53 When certifying a patient as terminally ill, a physician must
record a “brief narrative explanation of the clinical findings that supports
a life expectancy of 6 months or less . . . .”54 Underscoring the importance
of the narrative, the regulations stipulate the narrative’s substance and location within the certification.55 Moreover, the physician’s record must
contain “clinical information and other documentation” to support the
patient’s prognosis.56 Hospice providers that accept Medicare reimbursements without satisfying these requirements may be subject to FCA
liability.57
III. ANATOMY

OF

THE FCA

Congress originally enacted the FCA in 1863 to combat wartime profiteering, but after several amendments, the modern-day FCA is used more
extensively now than ever before.58 The Civil War era was infested with
“crooked” contractors who took advantage of government funding by selling the army sawdust instead of gunpowder, rotting ships, and spoiled
food rations.59 When confronted with this rampant fraud, Congress
passed the FCA to impose civil and criminal liability on those who submit[this] does not negate the fact that there must be a clinical basis for a
certification.”).
53. See United States v. AseraCare, Inc., 938 F.3d 1278, 1295 (11th Cir. 2019)
(admitting that “clinical judgments must be tethered to a patient’s valid medical
records,” while also asserting that “the law is designed to give physicians meaningful latitude . . . without fear that [their clinical] judgments will be second-guessed
after the fact by laymen in a liability proceeding.”).
54. See 42 C.F.R. § 418.22(b)(3) (2020).
55. See id. § 418.22(b)(3)(i)–(v) (outlining the acceptable locations for the
narrative in relation to the certification).
56. See id. § 418.22(b)(2) (“Clinical information and other documentation
that support the medical prognosis must accompany the certification and must be
filed in the medical record with the written certification . . . .”); see also id.
§ 412.46(b) (indicating that an evaluation of a physician’s certification necessarily
includes a review of the patient’s medical records).
57. Cf. Universal Health Servs. v. United States ex rel. Escobar, 579 U.S. 176,
192 (2016) (recognizing that “billing parties are often subject to thousands of complex statutory and regulatory provisions[,]” the Court found that where a provision
is labeled as a condition of payment, the labeling is relevant to a materiality inquiry
but not dispositive). For a brief overview of Escobar and its impact on the falsity
element of the FCA, see supra Section II.B.2.
58. See Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Justice Department Recovers Over $4.7
Billion from False Claims Act Cases in Fiscal Year 2016 (Dec. 14, 2016), https://
www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-recovers-over-47-billion-false-claimsact-cases-fiscal-year-2016 [https://perma.cc/45MV-WX37] (explaining that “Congress amended the [FCA] . . . to give the government a more effective tool against
false and fraudulent claims[,]” and, as a result, sixty percent of all FCA recoveries
in the last thirty years have been obtained since 2009).
59. Justice Department Recovers Over $2.8 Billion in 2018, supra note 4 (noting that during the Civil War, “crooked contractors defrauded the Union Army by
selling it sick mules, lame horses, sawdust instead of gunpowder, and rotted ships
with fresh paint”).
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ted false claims to the government.60 The FCA has gone through several
modifications during its lifespan and is currently in its most robust and
powerful form.61
This Part provides an overview of the modern-day FCA. First, Section
III.A discusses the FCA’s whistleblower provision which has greatly contributed to the FCA’s expansive reach. Next, Section III.B examines the three
main elements of a FCA claim, namely (1) knowledge, (2) materiality, and
(3) falsity.
A.

Qui Tam Claims: Breathing Life into the FCA

While authority to enforce the FCA primarily vests with the Attorney
General, additional authority vests to whistleblowers.62 Under the FCA’s
whistleblower provision, private individuals, referred to as “relators,” may
bring a qui tam action on behalf of the government in exchange for a
right to retain a portion of the funds recovered.63 After an investigation,
the government has the option to either intervene and take over the action, or allow the relator to proceed on their own.64 Relators have substantial incentives under the FCA to not only bring a qui tam claim, but to
continue its pursuit even when the government does not intervene.65 If
the government intervenes, relators receive between fifteen and twenty60. See Escobar, 579 U.S. at 181 (describing the congressional investigations
during the Civil War which revealed “a sordid picture of how the United States had
been billed for nonexistent or worthless goods, charged exorbitant prices for
goods delivered, and generally robbed in purchasing the necessities of war.” (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing United States v. McNinch, 356 U.S. 595, 599
(1958))).
61. See id. (explaining that since the FCA’s enactment, Congress “has repeatedly amended the Act, but [the Act’s] focus remains on those who present or directly induce the submission of false or fraudulent claims”); see also Al-Salihi, supra
note 9, at 442–43 (summarizing recent FCA modifications, including the added
incentives for whistleblowers, expansion of the definition of “claim,” as well as the
Fraud Enforcement and Recovery Act of 2009 (“FERA”) that expanded the scope
of liability).
62. See 31 U.S.C. § 3730(a)–(b) (2021) (identifying the parameters of civil
actions under the FCA).
63. Id. § 3730(b)(1) (recognizing the right of private persons to bring a civil
action under the FCA on behalf of the government); see also Al-Salihi, supra note 9,
at 470 (“The FCA deputizes ordinary citizens to report fraud against the government . . . . Inefficiencies arise when qui tam relators fail to comprehend exactly
what the FCA is deputizing them to do.”).
64. Id. § 3730(b)(4) (indicating that the government must decide whether to
intervene on the action after the investigatory period ends). Once filed, a qui tam
complaint is sealed for at least sixty days while the government investigates the
allegations. Id. § 3730(b)(2) (imposing that a qui tam complaint “shall be filed in
camera, shall remain under seal for at least 60 days, and shall not be served on the
defendant until the court so orders”); see also Meador & Warren, supra note 10, at
467 (recognizing that the amount of time cases remain under seal usually extends
“well beyond” sixty days, suggesting that depending on the number of extensions
requested by the government, the sealed period could last years).
65. See 31 U.S.C. § 3730(d)(1)–(2) (discussing the awards to qui tam
plaintiffs).
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five percent of the funds recovered.66 Alternatively, if the government decides not to intervene and the relator goes forward on behalf of the government, the relator is entitled to receive between twenty-five and thirty
percent of the recoveries.67
Prompted in large part by the FCA incentives, whistleblowers are now
uncovering fraud at an unprecedented rate.68 In fact, $2.1 billion, or seventy percent, of the $3 billion recovered in FCA-related recoveries in 2019
stemmed from qui tam claims.69 Qui tam claims are expected to continue
to play a critical role in fraud detection, with an average of more than
twelve new cases being brought every week.70
B.

Triaging the Elements of an FCA Claim

The FCA permits a cause of action against anyone who defrauds the
government.71 While the FCA has several liability provisions, 31 U.S.C.
§ 3729(a)(1)(A) (“Subsection (a)(1)(A)”) and § 3729(a)(1)(B) (“Subsection (a)(1)(B)”) are two of the most commonly invoked.72 Under Subsection (a)(1)(A), FCA liability is triggered when an individual “knowingly
presents, or causes to be presented, a false or fraudulent claim [to the
government] for payment or approval[.]”73 Further, under Subsection
(a)(1)(B), any person who “knowingly makes, uses, or causes to be made
or used, a false record or statement material to a false or fraudulent
claim[,]” is liable.74
66. See id. § 3730(d)(1) (explaining that the amount relators receive depends
“upon the extent to which the [relator] substantially contributed to the prosecution of the action”).
67. See id. § 3730(d)(2).
68. See Justice Department Recovers Over $3 Billion in 2019, supra note 5 (acknowledging “[t]axpayers have benefited greatly” as a result of qui tam claimants
“who are often required to make substantial sacrifices to bring these schemes to
light” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
69. See id. (recognizing that as compensation for their effort, qui tam claimants took home $265 million, or roughly nine percent, of the government’s recoveries in fiscal year 2019).
70. See id. (“The number of lawsuits filed under the qui tam provisions of the
[FCA] has grown significantly since 1986, with 633 qui tam suits filed this past
year—an average of more than 12 new cases every week.”).
71. See Universal Health Servs. v. United States ex rel. Escobar, 579 U.S. 176,
181 (2016) (clarifying the circumstances when the FCA imposes liability).
72. See Christopher L. Martin, Jr., Reining in Lincoln’s Law: A Call to Limit the
Implied Certification Theory of Liability Under the False Claims Act, 101 CAL. L. REV. 227,
233-34 (2013) (“Sections 3729(a)(1)(A)-(G) establish liability for seven fraudulent
acts. Of these seven, the conduct prohibited by subsection (a)(1)(A) has produced the most litigation.”); see also Al-Salihi, supra note 9, at 445 (explaining that
“[o]f the fraudulent acts described in section 3729, subsections (a)(1)(A) and
(a)(1)(B) are the subject of the most litigation”).
73. See 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1)(A); see also id. § 3729(a)(1) (codifying seven
areas of FCA liability as well as the corresponding penalties).
74. Compare id. § 3729(a)(1)(B) (incorporating the word “material”), with id.
§ 3729(a)(1)(A) (outlining parameters for liability without including the word
“material”).
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The financial impact of the FCA on health care providers cannot be
overstated.75 Violators are subject to treble damages, repayment of attorney fees, and civil penalties of up to $25,076 per false claim in 2022.76
Considering that each FCA case often involves tens of thousands of claims,
the aggregated penalty amount for each case quickly becomes “astronomical.”77 Beyond the financial burden of litigation, health care providers
face an additional punishment—exclusion from the government’s health
care programs.78 When the damages, penalties, fees, and reduction in future earnings are taken together, each cause of action has the potential to
cost health care providers millions—or even billions—of dollars.79 Despite these high stakes, much ambiguity still remains regarding the FCA’s
elements, namely: (1) knowledge, (2) materiality, and (3) falsity.80
1.

Knowledge and Materiality

First, as a testament to its broad scope, the FCA’s knowledge element
imposes liability not only on those who intend to defraud it, but also on
those who ignore a claim’s obvious defects.81 As a guide for the legal community, the knowledge element is defined within the FCA.82 Under the
FCA, a person acts knowingly with respect to the information’s falsity,
when that person has: (1) “actual knowledge[,]” (2) “acts in deliberate
ignorance[,]” or (3) “acts in reckless disregard[.]”83
75. Cf. id. § 3729(a)(1) (identifying the damages and penalties for violating
the FCA).
76. See 15 C.F.R. § 6.3 (2022) (codifying annual increases to FCA civil penalties, namely, increasing the minimum from $11,803 in 2021 to $12,537 in 2022 and
increasing the maximum from $23,607 in 2021 to $25,076 in 2022).
77. Mark A. Srere, Cliff Stricklin & Laura S. Perlov, The Changing Landscape of
FCA Litigation for Healthcare Providers Due to Increased Civil Penalty Amounts, BRYAN
CAVE LEIGHTON PAISNER LLP (Aug. 17, 2016), https://www.bclplaw.com/en-US/
insights/the-changing-landscape-of-fca-litigation-for-healthcare.html [https://
perma.cc/ZEB5-MQFD] (calling the FCA’s financial burden placed on health care
providers “enormous” and “astronomical”).
78. See 42 U.S.C. § 1320c-5 (2011) (authorizing the OIG to exclude providers
from participation in all federal health care programs).
79. See generally Justice Department Recovers Over $3 Billion in 2019, supra
note 5 (calling attention to the government’s FCA recoveries during fiscal year
2019, including—but not limited to—recoveries worth $1.4 billion, $500 million,
and $624 million from seven drug manufacturers).
80. See Al-Salihi, supra note 9, at 467 (acknowledging that the “FCA is undoubtedly complex” and to unravel its complexity, providers need a clear understanding of the elements because “a system as complex as private government
cannot function efficiently in an environment of acute uncertainty”).
81. See generally Winter ex rel. United States v. Gardens Reg’l Hosp. & Med.
Ctr., 953 F.3d 1108, 1117 (9th Cir. 2020) (acknowledging Congress’ intent for the
knowledge element to be broader than the common law).
82. See 31 U.S.C. § 3729(b)(1)(A) (2021) (defining “knowing” and “knowingly” for purposes of the FCA).
83. See id. § 3729(b)(1)(B) (clarifying the proof requirement to satisfy the
knowledge element of an FCA claim); see also Winter, 953 F.3d at 1122 (citing Fed.

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol67/iss1/5

12

Schaffer: Not Quite What the Doctor Ordered: The Third Circuit Pulls the Pl

2022]

NOTE

179

Second, the FCA’s materiality element—described as “rigorous” and
“demanding” by the Supreme Court—acts as a gatekeeper warding off frivolous claims.84 The FCA defines “material” as including information that
has a “natural tendency to influence, or be capable of influencing, the
payment or receipt of money or property.”85
2.

Falsity

Finally, falsity is the third element of a FCA claim and unlike the
other elements, it is not defined in the FCA.86 Rather, the falsity element
owes its complexity to the courts that have interpreted it.87 Two categories of falsity have developed: factual falsity and legal falsity.88 Factual falsity—arguably the more straightforward falsity type—applies when a
government contractor misrepresents the goods or services provided to
the government.89 For example, a claim would be factually false if a physician administered three flu shots but billed Medicare for ten flu shots.90
While factual falsity focuses on untrue facts in a claim, legal falsity focuses
on the contractor’s untrue certification of compliance with statutory or
regulatory requirements.91 For example, a claim would be legally false if
an unlicensed therapist billed Medicare for a patient’s therapy session
even though Medicare only reimburses for sessions conducted by licensed
therapists.92 In this example, the claim is factually accurate—a therapy
R. Civ. P. 9(b)) (reminding lower courts that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
stipulate that knowledge may be alleged generally).
84. See Universal Health Servs. v. United States ex rel. Escobar, 579 U.S. 176,
194 (2016) (explaining that an “all-purpose antifraud statute” intended to punish
minor noncompliance mistakes (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Allison Engine Co. v. U.S. ex rel. Sanders, 553 U.S. 662, 672 (2008))).
85. See 31 U.S.C. § 3729(b)(4) (defining “material” for purposes of the FCA).
86. See Robert G. Anderson, Clarification of the Implied False Certification Theory
Under the False Claims Act: The Supreme Court’s Decision in Universal Health Services, Inc.
v. United States ex rel. Escobar, 29 HEALTH LAW. 33, 33–34 (2016) (describing the
basics of the falsity element).
87. See Latoya C. Dawkins, Not So Fast: Proving Implied False Certification Theory
Post-Escobar, 42 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 163, 164 (2017) (acknowledging that as the
number of FCA cases continues to rise, understanding falsity and materiality has
become increasingly more important).
88. See Al-Salihi, supra note 9, at 453–59 (explaining difference between legal
falsity and factual falsity).
89. See Anderson, supra note 86, at 34 (“Factually false claims are easily understood . . . .”); Megan E. Italiano, An Implied Defense: Self-Disclosure Offers A Defense to
the Expanded False Claims Liability After Universal Health Services v. Escobar, 60 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 1943, 1951 (2019) (explaining that factually false claims represented
the bulk of health care FCA claims historically).
90. See Anderson, supra note 86, at 33–34 (illustrating factual falsity).
91. See also United States ex rel. Polukoff v. St. Mark’s Hosp., 895 F.3d 730, 741
(10th Cir. 2018) (describing instances of factual falsity, namely, when a claim is
submitted with an incorrect description of the goods or services or where the
goods or services were never actually provided).
92. See Anderson, supra note 86, at 34 (providing example of legal falsity).
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session did occur—but the therapist’s noncompliance with the licensing
requirement nevertheless renders the claim legally false.93
Legal falsity is further broken down into two categories: (1) express
false certification and (2) implied false certification.94 Under the express
false certification theory of liability, a government contractor expressly
represents compliance with a statutory or regulatory requirement, but has
not actually complied.95 For example, an express false certification claim
arises if an unlicensed therapist, when filling out a claim, checks a box
certifying compliance with a regulation requiring all therapists to be licensed.96 The therapist expressly certified that they satisfied the regulatory requirement even though the therapist is not actually licensed.97
In contrast, implied false certification liability may arise when someone simply submits a claim to the government without disclosing their statutory or regulatory violations.98 Consider the unlicensed therapist once
more: implied false certification liability may apply when the claim is submitted, even if there is nothing on the claim that expressly confirms compliance.99 As the most expansive interpretation of falsity, the implied false
certification theory was not uniformly applied by the circuit courts until
2016, when the Supreme Court stepped in to resolve the split in Universal
Health Services v. United States ex rel. Escobar.100
93. See Jacob J. Stephens, Dicta Me This: Implied False Certification to Materiality
Under the False Claims Act Post-Escobar, 44 U. DAYTON L. REV. 273, 279–80 (2019)
(describing “ ‘[f]actually false’ statements [as being] routinely associated with incorrect descriptions of goods or services provided, or a request for reimbursement
for goods or services that were never provided”); see also id. (defining “ ‘[l]egally
false’ statements [as being] false representations or false certifications of compliance with a governing law, statute or regulation, or contractual term.”).
94. See Al-Salihi, supra note 9, at 454 (explaining the circuit court split regarding the validity of the implied certification theory of liability as it existed prior to
the Supreme Court settling the split in Escobar).
95. See Polukoff, 895 F.3d at 741 (reasoning that the Supreme Court precedent
demonstrates “a more expansive view of ‘false or fraudulent’ ”).
96. See Italiano, supra note 89, at 1949–51 (explaining that “in the health care
context, ‘legally false’ claims may arise when an item or service has been provided
to patients, but an underlying federal rule was violated, such as nonadherence to a
Medicare requirement for participation.”).
97. See Stephens, supra note 93 (noting that express false certification claims
involve individuals who “ ‘falsely certif[y] compliance with a particular statute, regulation, or contractual term, where compliance is a prerequisite to payment’ . . . .
[and it] is irrelevant how the statement is made, as long as [it] relates to a claim for
payment from the government.” (quoting United States ex rel. Conner v. Salina
Reg’l Health Ctr., 543 F.3d 1211, 1217 (10th Cir. 2008))).
98. See Universal Health Servs. v. United States ex rel. Escobar, 579 U.S. 176,
181 (2016) (explaining that it does not matter if the government expressly identifies a condition of payment, rather, what matters is “whether the defendant knowingly violated a requirement that the defendant knows is material to the
Government’s payment decision”).
99. See United States ex rel. Hendow v. Univ. of Phx., 461 F.3d 1166, 1172 (9th
Cir. 2006) (discussing the various forms false certification can take including, but
not limited to “assertion[s], statement[s], or secret handshake[s]”).
100. 136 S. Ct. 1989 (2016).
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In Escobar, the Supreme Court unanimously upheld the implied false
certification theory of liability, reasoning that false misrepresentations are
actionable under the FCA.”101 The Court explained that when a statute
does not define a term, it is Congress’ intent to import the term’s wellsettled common-law meaning.102 Without a statutory definition of falsity,
the Court relied on common-law fraud principles in defining the FCA’s
scope.103 Given that the common-law meaning of fraud encompasses misleading omissions as a form of false misrepresentation, the Court applied
the same reasoning to the FCA.104
IV. A SUPERFICIAL HAIRLINE FRACTURE: CIRCUIT COURTS RUN INTO
COMPLICATIONS WHEN EVALUATING CLINICAL JUDGMENTS AND
FCA FALSITY
Recently, and as a matter of first impression, circuit courts have had
to determine whether conflicting expert opinions are sufficient to create a
triable dispute of fact as to falsity.105 The so-called circuit split on this
matter exists among the Eleventh, Ninth, and Third Circuits.106

101. Id. at 1999, 2002 (reasoning that FCA liability is not constricted to claims
containing express falsehoods and stating, “. . . . instead of adopting a circumscribed view of what it means for a claim to be false or fraudulent,’ concerns about
fair notice and open-ended liability ‘can be effectively addressed through strict
enforcement of the Act’s materiality and [knowledge] requirements.’ ” (quoting
United States v. Sci. Applications Int’l Corp., 626 F.3d 1257, 1270 (D.C. Cir.
2010))).
102. Id. at 1999 (pointing out that when a statutory definition is not provided,
Congress’ intends to import the term’s common-law meaning).
103. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 525 (AM. L. INST. 1977) (“One
who fraudulently makes a misrepresentation of fact, opinion, intention or law for
the purpose of inducing another to act or to refrain from action in reliance upon
it, is subject to liability . . . .”).
104. See Escobar, 579 U.S.at 189 (interpreting the FCA terms, false and fraudulent under common-law fraud in the absence of statutory definitions); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 529, cmt. c (AM. L. INST. 1977) (“[A] statement that
contains only favorable matters and omits all reference to unfavorable matters is as
much a false representation as if all the facts stated were untrue.”); see also OmniCare, Inc. v. Laborers Dist. Council Constr. Indus. Pension Fund, 575 U.S. 175,
188–91 (2015) (holding that opinions could be false if not genuinely held or if
based on untrue material facts).
105. Compare United States v. AseraCare, Inc., 938 F.3d 1278, 1291 (11th Cir.
2019) (“Neither this Court nor any of our sister circuits has considered the standard for falsity in the context of the Medicare hospice benefit, where the controlling condition of reimbursement is a matter of clinical judgment.”), with Winter ex
rel. United States v. Gardens Reg’l Hosp. & Med. Ctr., 953 F.3d 1108, 1114–15 (9th
Cir. 2020) (involving a former employee who had the responsibility of reviewing
hospital admission criteria).
106. See Winter, 953 F.3d at 1114–15; see also AseraCare, 938 F.3d at 1284 (reviewing a case involving alleged hospice fraud).
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The Eleventh Circuit Transplants Objectivity into the FCA in United
States v. AseraCare, Inc.

In AseraCare, the Eleventh Circuit held that reasonable differences in
clinical judgment, without more, cannot establish falsity.107 The Eleventh
Circuit reasoned that deference must be given to physicians and explained
that a physician’s certification cannot trigger FCA liability unless the
clinical judgment reflects an “objective falsity.”108 After introducing its
new standard, the court clarified what constitutes an objective falsity;
namely, situations where (1) the physician fails to assess the patient’s condition prior to asserting a clinical judgment; (2) the certifying physician
does not believe their clinical judgment is accurate; or (3) the expert testimony demonstrates that no reasonable physician would have reached a
similar clinical judgment.109 Health care providers had reason to celebrate the Eleventh Circuit’s ruling, given that AseraCare effectively narrowed the FCA’s scope—but their celebrations did not last long.
B.

The Ninth Circuit Takes a Noninvasive Approach in Winter ex rel.
United States v. Gardens Regional Hospital & Medical Center

It took less than seven months for the Eleventh Circuit’s objective falsity standard to be confronted by another circuit.110 In Winter, the Ninth
Circuit held that clinical judgments are capable of being false under the
FCA.111 In contrast to AseraCare, in which hospice certifications were the
107. AseraCare, 938 F.3d at 1301 (stating that the FCA should not be used as
the “[g]overnment’s primary line of defense against questionable claims for reimbursement” without a showing that the claim reflected an “objective and knowing
falsehood”); see also id. at 1297 (holding that “in order to show objective falsity as to
a claim . . . the [g]overnment must show something more than mere different of
reasonable opinion concerning the prognosis . . . .”).
108. Id. at 1296 (“Nothing in the statutory or regulatory framework suggests
that a clinical judgment regarding a patient’s prognosis is invalid or illegitimate
merely because an unaffiliated physician reviewing the relevant records after the
fact disagrees with that clinical judgment.”). The court clarified, stating that “a
reasonable difference of opinion among physicians reviewing medical documentation . . . is not sufficient on its own to suggest that those judgements—or any claims
based on them—are false under the FCA.” Id. at 1297. Further, the court noted
that a “sincerely held clinical judgment” will not be considered false, even if it is
later contended to be wrong. Id.
109. See id. (outlining the scenarios where a claim could reflect an objective
falsity).
110. See Winter, 953 F.3d at 1108 (issuing its ruling on March 23, 2020);
United States ex rel. Druding v. Care Alts., 952 F.3d 89, 89 (3d Cir. 2020) (issuing
its ruling on March 4, 2020).
111. See Winter, 953 F.3d at 1117 (“[O]pinions are not, and have never been,
completely insulated from scrutiny.” (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting
United States v. Paulus, 894 F.3d 267, 275–76 (6th Cir. 2018))). The court noted
that the Tenth Circuit previously recognized medical judgements can be false
under the FCA if the judgement is not considered “reasonable . . . under the government’s definition of the phrase.” Id. at 1118 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting United States ex rel. Polukoff v. St. Mark’s Hospital, 895 F.3d 730, 742
(10th Cir. 2018)).
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focus, the Winter court faced questions relating to Medicare’s medical necessity requirement for inpatient admissions.112 Nonetheless, these cases
are comparable because they both focus on a physician’s clinical judgment
in relation to one of Medicare’s regulatory requirements.113
In the Ninth Circuit’s carefully constructed Winter opinion, the court
suggested that its analytical approach did not conflict with the Eleventh
Circuit’s approach in AseraCare for three reasons.114 First, in the Ninth
Circuit’s view, the Eleventh Circuit ruled on whether a reasonable disagreement between physicians, without more, is sufficient to establish falsity—not whether a medical opinion could ever be false.115 Second,
relying on an AseraCare footnote, the Ninth Circuit asserted that the Eleventh Circuit did not intend for its objective falsity standard to apply beyond hospice certifications.116 Finally, as a back-up, the Ninth Circuit
included a one sentence disclaimer indicating that, “to the extent that
AseraCare can be read to graft any type of ‘objective falsity’ requirement
onto the FCA, we reject that proposition.”117
V.

STITCHING TOGETHER

A

QUI TAM CLAIM: THE FACTS
OF DRUDING

AND

PROCEDURE

The same month that the Ninth Circuit issued its ruling in Winter, the
Third Circuit also weighed in on the matter.118 In Druding, four former
employees filed a qui tam complaint in the United States District Court for
the District of New Jersey against their former employer and hospice pro112. See Winter, 953 F.3d at 1112–13 (involving a qui tam claimant alleging
that a hospital falsely submitted claims to Medicare for inpatient admissions that
were not medically necessary).
113. See Najjar, supra note 5, at 149–52 (finding similarities between AseraCare,
a case involving medical necessity, and United States v. Paulus, 894 F.3d 267 (6th
Cir. 2018), a case involving criminal FCA liability).
114. See Winter, 953 F.3d at 1118–19 (reasoning that its ruling is not contradicted by the Eleventh Circuit’s findings in AseraCare). But see id. at 1120 (admitting that the evidence presented goes beyond a mere difference in expert
testimony).
115. Id. at 1118–19 (emphasis added) (looking past the Eleventh’s circuit’s
language regarding objectivity, the Ninth Circuit asserts that the AseraCare holding
should not be interpreted to apply to all subjective statements).
116. Id. at 1119 (explaining that the AseraCare court specifically noted that the
objective falsehood standard does not “necessarily apply to a physician’s certification of medical necessity”); see also AseraCare, 938 F.3d at 1300 n.15 (distinguishing
United States ex rel. Polukoff v. St. Mark’s Hospital, 895 F.3d 730 (10th Cir. 2018),
by noting the factual differences between medical necessity claims, such as the one
in Polukoff, and hospice claims).
117. Winter, 953 F.3d at 1119 (citing United States ex rel. Druding v. Care Alts.,
952 F.3d 89,94 (3d Cir. 2020)) (holding the FCA does not require a plaintiff to
plead objective falsehood because any opinion, even that of a physician, can be
false or fraudulent).
118. See Druding, 952 F.3d at 91 (“This case requires us to consider whether
and when clinical judgements can be considered ‘false’ in the context of the
[FCA].”).
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vider, Care Alternatives, Inc.119 The relators alleged the hospice provider
knowingly submitted false claims to Medicare.120 More specifically, the
relators argued the hospice provider admitted patients who were not actually terminally ill and pressured employees to alter medical records to
make patients appear eligible for the MHB.121 After an investigation spanning more than seven years, the government decided not to intervene and
the relators proceeded with the suit on their own.122
Medical records from a sampling of forty-seven patients were produced during discovery and both sides presented expert testimony regarding the accuracy of the patients’ prognoses.123 Specifically, the relators’
medical expert opined that of the forty-seven patients whose records were
reviewed, twenty-one—or roughly forty-five percent—were either (1) ineligible for hospice for all or part of the time they were enrolled in hospice,
or (2) had incomplete records.124 Moreover, the relator’s expert found
that of the 603 hospice certification periods for those forty-seven patients,
214—or approximately thirty-five percent—were improperly certified for
hospice eligibility.125 In contrast, the hospice provider’s medical expert
testified that each patient prognosis was reasonable.126
Following discovery, the hospice provider filed a motion for summary
judgment.127 Focusing solely on the falsity element, the district court
granted the hospice provider’s motion.128 The court identified the con119. Druding v. Care Alts., (District Ct. Druding I), 164 F. Supp. 3d 621, 625
(D.N.J. 2016) (ruling on the first summary judgment motion).
120. Druding v. Care Alts., Inc. (District Ct. Druding II), 346 F. Supp. 3d 669,
672 (D.N.J. 2018), rev’d & remanded sub nom., United States ex rel. Druding v. Care
Alts., 952 F.3d 89 (3d Cir. 2020) (providing the factual background for the plaintiff-realtors claim).
121. Id. at 677–81 (exploring the limited evidence that the relators provided).
122. Id. at 671 (explaining that the government, despite declining to intervene, would nevertheless remain an interested party in the matter); see also 31
U.S.C. § 3730(b)(2) (2021) (indicating that after investigating the claims raised,
the government has the option to intervene and proceed with an action brought
by a qui tam claimant).
123. District Ct. Druding II, 346 F. Supp. 3d at 681 (providing the conflicting
expert findings of two physicians).
124. Id. (explaining the relator’s expert testimony).
125. Id.
126. See District Ct. Druding II, 346 F. Supp. 3d at 681; see also Appellant’s Reply
Brief at 15, United States ex rel. Druding v. Care Alts., 2019 WL 1894640 (3d Cir.
2019) (C.A.3) (asserting that the district court overlooked the relator’s expert’s
opinion that even if confined to the fifteen patients identified in the complaint,
twelve of the fifteen—or eight percent—were inappropriate for hospice care for at
least part of their stays).
127. See District Ct. Druding II, 346 F. Supp. 3d at 684 (denying Care Alternative’s second motion to dismiss for a supposedly deficient Written Disclosure Statement but granting Care Alternative’s motion for summary judgment).
128. Id. at 687 (identifying similarities between two other district court cases,
namely, that every patient was physician-certified for the hospice benefit, that
there was no evidence that any physician received a kickback to certify a patient,
and that no particular physician was accused of certifying ineligible patients); see
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flicting expert testimony as the only viable evidence of falsity and held that
without more, the relators had presented insufficient evidence of “objective falsity.”129 Echoing the points made in AseraCare, the district court
explained that a reasonable difference in medical opinion is insufficient to
create a triable dispute of fact for falsity.130 On appeal, the Third Circuit
reversed the district court’s grant of summary judgment, reasoning that a
physician’s expert opinion is not immune from scrutiny.131 On February
22, 2021, the Supreme Court declined to review the Third Circuit’s decision in Druding, leaving the so-called circuit split to linger.132
VI. THE THIRD CIRCUIT OPTS

FOR AN

INVASIVE APPROACH

IN

DRUDING

Unlike the Ninth Circuit, which took a more nuanced approach in
Winter, the Third Circuit opted for a bolder tactic in Druding.133 The
also United States v. AseraCare, Inc., 176 F. Supp. 3d 1282, 1283 (N.D. Ala. 2016),
vacated & remanded sub nom. United States v. AseraCare, Inc., 938 F.3d 1278 (11th
Cir. 2019) (“When hospice certifying physicians and medical experts look at the
very same medical records and disagree about whether the medical records support hospice eligibility, the opinion of one medical expert alone cannot prove falsity without further evidence of an objective falsehood.”); see also United States ex
rel. Wall v. Vista Hospice Care, No. 3:07-CV-00604-M, 2016 WL 3449833, at *17
(N.D. Tex. June 20, 2016), appeal dismissed, United States ex rel. Wall v. Vista Hospice Care, No. 17-11478, 2018 WL 3054767, at *1 (5th Cir. Jan. 11, 2018) (“[A]n
FCA claim about the exercise of [a physician’s clinical] judgment must be predicated on the presence of an objectively verifiable fact at odds with the exercise of
that judgment, not a matter of questioning subjective clinical analysis.”).
129. Compare District Ct. Druding II, 346 F. Supp. 3d at 688 (granting the summary judgment motion), with United States v. Paulus, 894 F.3d 267, 275 (6th Cir.
2018) (“[O]pinions are not, and have never been, completely insulated from scrutiny. At the very least, opinions may trigger liability for fraud when they are not
honestly held by their maker, or when the speaker knows of facts that are fundamentally incompatible with his opinion.”).
130. See District Ct. Druding II, 346 F. Supp. 3d at 688 (explaining that the
“ultimate issue is not whether the certification of hospice eligibility was correct or
incorrect, but rather whether it was knowingly false.”); see also id. at 687 (emphasizing that there is no binding authority that directly contradicts applying an objective falsehood standard).
131. See United States ex rel. Druding v. Care Alts., 952 F.3d 89, 91 (3d Cir.
2020) (rejecting the objective falsehood requirement for FCA falsity). In reaching
this conclusion, the Third Circuit relied in part on the common-law definition of
fraud. See id. at 95.
132. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 2, Care Alts. v. United States (U.S.
2020) (No. 20-371), 2020 WL 5657690 (asking “[w]hether a physician’s honestly
held clinical judgment regarding hospice certification can be ‘false’ under the
False Claims Act based solely on a reasonable difference of opinion among physicians.”); see also Care Alts. v. United States, No. 20-371, 2021 WL 666386 (U.S.
2021) (denying certiorari on February 22, 2021).
133. See Stephen A. Wood, Falsity Under the False Claims Act—The Need for An
Objective Standard of Proof, WASH. LEGAL FOUND. (June 2, 2020), https://
www.wlf.org/2020/06/02/wlf-legal-pulse/falsity-under-the-false-claims-act-theneed-for-an-objective-standard-of-proof/ [https://perma.cc/JWQ3-WL6B]
(describing Winter as “less troubling” than Druding due to the procedural timing
and nuanced facts of the case).
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Third Circuit’s opinion began with a statutory analysis, moved on to discuss two types of falsity, considered conflicting expert opinion as proof of
falsity, and finally, flatly rejected the objective falsity standard—thereby
creating the perception of a circuit split.134
Focusing on the FCA’s plain language at the outset of its analysis, the
Third Circuit identified two flaws in the district court’s reasoning.135 First,
the Third Circuit reasoned that opinions are capable of being false under
the FCA.136 Because the FCA does not statutorily define “false” and
“fraudulent,” the court looked to the common-law to fill the definitional
gap.137 Relying on Supreme Court precedent, Third Circuit jurisprudence, as well as the Restatement (Second) of Torts, the court concluded
that under common-law, an opinion—expert or not—can be false.138
Second, the court held that the objective falsity standard improperly
conflates knowledge and falsity.139 In the Third Circuit’s view, the district
court’s description of objective falsity included reference to a physician’s
state of mind by using the words, “knowingly” and “believed,” thereby
merging knowledge and falsity.140 The Third Circuit reasoned that by
134. See Debra A. Weinrich & Dana Petrillo, Mere Disagreement or Knowing Falsehood: The Circuit Split on False Claims Act “Falsity”, WHITE & WILLIAMS LLP (Mar. 11,
2020), https://www.whiteandwilliams.com/resources-alerts-Mere-Disagreement-orKnowing-Falsehood-The-Circuit-Split-on-False-Claims-Act-Falsity.html [https://
perma.cc/SP5X-YZEV] (explaining the perceived circuit split).
135. See Druding, 952 F.3d at 95 (“As with any statutory interpretation question, our analysis begins with the text.” (citing Universal Health Servs. v. United
States ex rel. Escobar, 579 U.S. 176, 187 (2016))).
136. See id. (reasoning that a difference of opinion can show falsity under the
FCA). But see Omnicare, Inc. v. Laborers Dist. Council Constr. Indus. Pension
Fund, 575 U.S. 175, 189 (2015) (reviewing a securities law case, the court reasoned
that an opinion “is not necessarily misleading when an issuer knows, but fails to
disclose, some fact cutting the other way”).
137. Druding, 952 F.3d at 95 (stating that under the common law, opinions
can be false for purposes of liability). But see Anderson, supra note 86, at 33 (referring to the lack of a definition for “false” and “fraudulent” as “one of the most
glaring anomalies or oversights in the FCA”).
138. See generally Omnicare, 575 U.S. at 190 (discussing securities law, explaining that “[a] reasonable investor does not expect that every fact known to an issuer
supports its opinion statement”); see Druding, 952 F.3d at 95; see also RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 525 cmt. c (AM. L. INST. 1977) (“[A] statement that a particular person . . . is of a particular opinion or has a particular intention is a misrepresentation if the person in question does not hold the opinion or have the intention
asserted.”); see also id. § 539 cmt. a (“Frequently a statement which, though in form
an opinion upon facts not disclosed or otherwise known to their recipient, is reasonably understood as implying that there are facts that justify the opinion or at
least that there are no facts that are incompatible with it.”).
139. Druding, 952 F.3d at 96 (explaining that the “plain language of the FCA
denotes [knowledge] as an element independent of falsity” (first citing 31 U.S.C.
§ 3729(a)(1)(A) (2021); then citing United States ex rel. Petratos v. Genentech
Inc., 855 F.3d 481, 487 (3d Cir. 2017))).
140. See id. (reasoning that requiring evidence that a physician lied establishes
a knowledge element that is inconsistent with the FCA); see also Druding v. Care
Alts., Inc. (District Ct. Druding II), 346 F. Supp. 3d 669, 676 (D.N.J. 2018), rev’d &
remanded sub nom., United States ex rel. Druding v. Care Alts., 952 F.3d 89 (3d Cir.
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combining two elements into a single standard, the objective falsity standard was inconsistent with the plain language and established application
of the FCA.141
Next, the Third Circuit faulted the objective falsity standard for circumscribing falsity to be factual falsity.142 Relying on Supreme Court precedent, Third Circuit case law, and persuasive authority from the Tenth
Circuit, the court underscored the validity of a FCA claim based on a theory of legal falsity.143 The court asserted that under a theory of legal falsity, FCA liability is triggered by showing a provider’s noncompliance.144
Accordingly, the court explained that a hospice provider’s noncompliance
with either the MHB’s terminal illness requirement or the documentation
requirement presents a basis for a viable legal falsity claim.145
Following its discussion on factual and legal falsity, the Third Circuit
rejected the district court’s “bright-line” rule that a physician’s opinion
cannot be false.146 Emphasizing that doctors are capable of lying—just
like any other person—the court held that conflicting medical expert
opinion can be sufficient to support a legal falsity claim.147 The Third
Circuit pointed out that the practice of medicine often includes compli2020) (reasoning that the falsity element of the relators claim is lacking because
they were unable to single out a particular doctor who certified a patient whom
that physician “believed was not hospice eligible” (emphasis added)).
141. Druding, 952 F.3d at 96 (addressing provider’s concerns regarding excessive FCA liability and emphasizing the rigorous requirements for knowledge and
materiality—but not falsity).
142. Id. at 96–97 (noting that “legal falsity necessarily encompasses situations
of factual falsity”).
143. Id. at 97 (finding support in a Tenth Circuit opinion, where an allegation of legal falsity was upheld); see also United States ex rel. Polukoff v. St. Mark’s
Hosp., 895 F.3d 730, 741 (10th Cir. 2018), cert. dismissed sub nom. Intermountain
Health v. United States ex rel. Polukoff, 139 S. Ct. 2690 (2019) (distinguishing between factual falsity and legal falsity).
144. Druding, 952 F.3d at 96 (3d Cir. 2020) (elaborating that falsity encompasses “liability based on non-compliance with regulatory instructions and not just
objectively verifiable facts”). The court explained that the realtors must show the
hospice provider failed to meet at least one of the MHB’s conditions of payment
and determined that “disagreement between experts as to a patient’s prognosis” is
evidence of non-compliance. Id. at 97.
145. For an overview of legal falsity, see supra Section III.B.2.
146. Druding, 952 F.3d at 98 (“[R]eliability and believability of expert testimony . . . is exclusively for the jury to decide.” (internal quotation marks omitted)
(quoting United States v. Paulus, 894 F.3d 267, 277 (6th Cir. 2018))); see also
Paulus, 894 F.3d at 270-71 (involving a lawsuit against a cardiologist where expert
testimony was used to demonstrate that the cardiologist overstated angiogram
blockages to increase number of procedures performed).
147. Druding, 952 F.3d at 98 (explaining that testimony challenging a medical
opinion is appropriate evidence for a jury to consider when determining falsity).
But see Paulus, 894 F.3d at 276 (finding that a cardiologist was convicted under the
criminal FCA statute “for misrepresenting facts, not giving opinions[,]” explaining
that “it would be an insult to common sense and the practice of medicine to say
that [the cardiologist] was not measuring facts (or attempting to do so) when [the
cardiologist] conducted the angiograms at issue here”).
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cated scientific theories and reasoned that expert testimony is an appropriate means to explain the depth of an alleged lie to a jury.148
Finally, the Third Circuit concluded its opinion by bluntly rejecting
the Eleventh Circuit’s rationale in AseraCare.149 In support of its decision,
the court reiterated that subjective opinions are capable of being false and
repeated that falsity and knowledge must be considered independently in
its jurisdiction.150 Moreover, the Third Circuit explained that the Eleventh Circuit focused too heavily on the MHB’s terminal illness certification requirement and undervalued the documentation requirement.151
VII. GETTING

A

SECOND OPINION: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS

OF

DRUDING

Although the Third Circuit had substantial reason to reverse, its analysis in Druding is difficult to defend for three reasons.152 First, the court’s
interpretation of the objective falsity standard is inconsistent with the Eleventh Circuit’s opinion in AseraCare.153 Second, the Third Circuit missed
an opportunity to distinguish the facts of AseraCare.154 Third, the court
asserted that the objective falsity standard conflates knowledge and falsity,
but failed to meaningfully strengthen that assertion.155
A.

Stabilizing Druding: Prescribing a More Consistent Interpretation of
AseraCare

In response to the Third Circuit’s flat rejection of the objective falsity
standard, commentators were quick to announce yet another circuit split
148. Druding, 952 F.3d at 98 (“[M]edical opinions may be ‘false’ and an expert’s testimony challenging a physician’s medical opinion can be appropriate evidence for the jury to consider on the question of falsity.”).
149. Id. at 99 (departing from the Eleventh Circuit’s objective falsehood
framework to FCA falsity); see also Patrick M. Hagan, Two Circuits Hold the FCA Does
Not Require “Objective Falsity,” Creating Confusion on the Appropriate Standard, DINSMORE & SHOHL LLP (Mar. 31, 2020), https://www.dinsmore.com/publications/
two-circuits-hold-the-fca-does-not-require-objective-falsity-creating-confusion-onthe-appropriate-standard/ [https://perma.cc/T6C9-Q3V7] (discussing the perceived circuit split).
150. See Druding, 952 F.3d at 99 (reiterating reasons for rejecting the objective
falsity standard).
151. See id. (acknowledging that the district court issued its opinion prior to
the Eleventh Circuit’s affirmance of AseraCare).
152. See Wood, supra note 133 (identifying inconsistencies in the Druding
opinion).
153. See United States v. AseraCare, Inc., 938 F.3d 1278, 1291 (11th Cir. 2019)
(agreeing with the general sense of the district court’s ruling it was reviewing); see
also id. at 1297 (adopting a standard that “in order to properly state a claim under
the FCA . . . [a plaintiff] must identify facts and circumstances surrounding a patient’s certification that are inconsistent with the proper exercise of a physician’s
clinical judgement”).
154. For a discussion on how the Third Circuit could have distinguished AseraCare, see infra Section VII.B.
155. For consideration of how the Eleventh Circuit’s objective falsity standard
may be a knowledge analysis disguised as falsity, see infra Section VII.C.
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in FCA litigation—but that classification is overstated.156 The Third Circuit seemed to focus on the word “objective,” instead of attempting to understand the Eleventh Circuit’s intended meaning of “objective” and
“falsity” when brought together.157 In other words, the Third Circuit’s
primary contention with the Eleventh Circuit’s objective falsity standard
may boil down to the naming convention used.158
The circuits involved in the so-called circuit split all agree that expert
testimony may be used to establish a triable dispute of fact for FCA falsity.159 Contrary to the holding in Druding, the objective falsity standard is
not limited to factual falsity.160 The Third Circuit argued that the Eleventh Circuit’s objective falsity standard only embraces factual inaccuracies,
and therefore, excludes conflicting expert opinion because opinions are
subjective.161 However, objective falsity, as described in AseraCare, includes situations where expert testimony is employed to establish that no
reasonable physician would have certified the patient’s terminally ill prognosis.162 Accordingly, the objective falsity standard does not exclude ex156. Compare Jessica E. Joseph, Lawrence M. Kraus, Christopher J. Donovan,
Lori A. Rubin, Judith A. Waltz, et al., Third Circuit Creates Budding Circuit Split in
United States v. Care Alternatives, Ruling That “Objective Falsity” Is Not Required Under
FCA, FOLEY & LARDNER LLP (Mar. 10, 2020), https://www.foley.com/en/insights/
publications/2020/03/third-rules-objective-falsity-not-required-fca [https://
perma.cc/HC9X-5RSE] (naming it a “budding circuit split”), with Lori A. Rubin,
Jessica E. Joseph, Lisa M. Noller, Pamela Johnston, Thomas F. Carlucci & Michael
J. Tuteur, Ninth Circuit Holds an “Objective Falsehood” is Not Required for Violation of
False Claims Act, 10 NAT’L L. REV. 278 (Apr. 20, 2020) (suggesting it may be too
early to call it a circuit split), and Samantha P. Kingsbury, Ninth Circuit Joins Several
Others in Finding that Lack of Medical Necessity Claims Can Proceed Under the False
Claims Act, MINTZ (Apr. 2, 2020) (“[I]t may be premature to describe the views of
the various federal circuits to have considered this issue as a true ‘split’ requiring
resolution by the highest court.”).
157. See United States ex rel. Druding v. Care Alts., 952 F.3d 89, 96–97 (3d Cir.
2020) (focusing on the subjective nature of opinions).
158. See Rubin, supra note 156 (explaining difference between courts in socalled split may be just “semantics”).
159. See Druding, 952 F.3d at 97 (holding a “disagreement between experts as
to a patient’s prognosis may be evidence of [falsity]”); see also Winter ex rel. United
States v. Gardens Reg’l Hosp. & Med. Ctr., 953 F.3d 1108, 1120 (9th Cir. 2020)
(pointing out that the plaintiff “allege[d] more than just a reasonable difference
of opinion”); see also United States v. AseraCare, Inc., 938 F.3d 1278, 1297 (11th
Cir. 2019) (“[A] reasonable difference of opinion among physicians reviewing medical documentation ex post is not sufficient on its own [to establish falsity].” (emphasis added)).
160. See AseraCare, 938 F.3d at 1297 (holding that objective falsity is shown
when the plaintiff provides something more than a mere difference of reasonable
opinion).
161. Druding, 952 F.3d at 97 (“According to the District Court, a medical expert’s opinion is false for purposes of FCA liability only when there is evidence of
factual inaccuracy. In other words, opinions being subjective, a differing medical
conclusion regarding a patient’s prognosis alone is not enough to show the certifying physician’s determination of terminal illness was factually incorrect.”).
162. See AseraCare, 938 F.3d at 1297 (describing scenarios when an objective
falsity could be found).
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pert testimony altogether; rather, expert opinion is permitted when it
demonstrates that the certifying physician got the prognosis so wrong that
no reasonable physician would have come to the same conclusion.163
Moreover, the Third, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits agree that clinical
judgments can be false.164 While the Eleventh Circuit called for deference
to be given to a medical expert’s good-faith opinion, it did not seek to
completely immunize physician’s from FCA liability.165 The Eleventh Circuit established an evidentiary threshold based on the reasonability of a
clinical judgment to avoid frivolous claims aimed at second guessing reasonable medical opinion.166 In fact, the Eleventh Circuit noted that it was
“[l]eaving aside the question [of] whether the substance of an opinion, by
itself, c[ould] ever be deemed to constitute an objective falsity[.]”167 In
other words, expert testimony may be used to show falsity, but to be effective, the testimony needs to demonstrate that no reasonable physician
would have reached the same conclusion.168
By rejecting the objective falsity standard outright without replacing
it, the Third Circuit has provided little guidance to the legal community
on how to approach falsity in future cases.169 Beyond the Third Circuit’s
lack of direction, the Supreme Court has declined to step in to provide
clarification.170 Without proper guidance, lower courts will continue to
163. See id. (noting that “expert evidence” can be used to reveal flaws in
clinical judgment); see also Murad Hussain, Manvin S. Mayell & Emily ReederRicchetti, Is This Any Message to Send Our Medical Heroes? Second-Guessing the Clinical
Judgments of Doctors on the Front Line, ARNOLD & PORTER (Mar. 27, 2020), https://
www.arnoldporter.com/en/perspectives/blogs/fca-qui-notes/posts/2020/03/isthis-any-message-to-send-our-medical-heroes [https://perma.cc/RNC8-MADE]
(“Both savvy patients and doctors know that a contrary second opinion or clinical
judgment does not necessarily mean that the first opinion was wrong, let alone
false or fraudulent.”).
164. See Druding, 952 F.3d at 98 (asserting “medical opinions may be ‘false’ ”);
see also Winter, 953 F.3d at 1119 (reasoning that opinions regarding medical necessity can be false or fraudulent); AseraCare, 938 F.3d at 1297 (providing clear examples of ways in which clinical judgements would be false).
165. See Druding, 952 F.3d at 100 (“The Eleventh Circuit also determined that
clinical judgments cannot be untrue.” (citing AseraCare, 938 F.3d at 1297)).
166. See Winter, 953 F.3d at 1119–20 (concluding that its opinion did not conflict with the Eleventh Circuit’s rationale).
167. AseraCare, 938 F.3d at 1302; see Winter, 953 F.3d at 1119 (explaining that
the Eleventh Circuit “clearly did not consider all subjective statements—including
medical opinions—to be capable of falsity”).
168. For further discussion on the Eleventh Circuit’s holding in AseraCare, see
supra Section IV.A and accompanying notes.
169. See Rubin, supra note 156 (acknowledging that the somewhat “incongruous standards will no doubt be the subject of FCA cases moving forward”); see generally Hussain, supra note 163 (providing an overview of the court’s analysis in
Druding).
170. See Brian F. McEvoy, Asher D. Funk & Dayna C. LaPlante, SCOTUS Declines to Review False Claims Act Cases on Falsity and Medical Judgment, POLSINELLI PC
(Feb. 24, 2021), https://www.polsinelli.com/intelligence/scotus-declines-to-review-false-claims-act [https://perma.cc/SVU6-FPHF] (noting Supreme Court de-
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struggle to determine when, if ever, a medical expert’s opinion can create
a triable dispute of fact as to falsity.171
B.

Different Underlying Conditions: A Comparison of the Facts and Procedure
of Druding and AseraCare

As a way to soften the blow of its flat rejection of the objective falsity
standard, the Third Circuit could have distinguished AseraCare in three
ways.172 First, Druding involves an appeal of an order granting summary
judgment while AseraCare involves a case that had already gone to trial.173
Second, unlike AseraCare where the conflicting expert testimony merely
created a reasonable difference in opinion, the expert in Druding testified
that no reasonable physician would have concluded that the patients at
issue were terminally ill.174 The expert testimony in Druding provided the
very thing that the Eleventh Circuit said was missing in AseraCare—an unreasonable difference in expert opinion.175 Third, while the plaintiffs in
Druding alleged that the required documentation for several patients was
either missing or incomplete, the plaintiffs in AseraCare made no such argument.176 In fact, the Eleventh Circuit even pointed out that the parties
were in agreement that “each patient certification was supported by a
meaningful set of medical records . . . .”177 Consequently, the Third Circuit’s assertion that the Eleventh Circuit undervalued the documentation
requirement is without merit because there was no documentation complaint in AseraCare.178
clined to review Third Circuit’s decision in Druding, as well as Ninth Circuit’s
ruling in Winter).
171. See id. (encouraging health care providers to be prepared to demonstrate
the reasonability of their medical opinion).
172. For further discussion on AseraCare, see supra Section IV.A. For further
discussion on the facts of Druding, see supra Section V.A.
173. See United States v. AseraCare, Inc. 938 F.3d 1278, 1290 (11th Cir. 2019)
(providing the procedural posture of the case); United States ex rel. Druding v.
Care Alts., 952 F.3d 89, 91 (3d Cir. 2020).
174. See AseraCare, 938 F.3d at 1287 (noting that the government’s expert testified by giving an “expert opinion” as to what constitutes “terminally ill”); see also
Druding, 952 F.3d 89, 94 (3d Cir. 2020) (noting that the plaintiff’s physician testified that “any reasonable physician would have reached the conclusion he
reached”).
175. See Druding, 952 F.3d at 100 (acknowledging the Eleventh Circuit’s reasonability threshold for the objective falsity standard yet asserting that the Eleventh
Circuit held that “clinical judgments cannot be untrue”).
176. Compare Druding, 952 F.3d at 94 (noting that the plaintiff’s physician
found that the medical records regarding the status of several patients were incomplete), with AseraCare, 938 F.3d at 1289 (highlighting that the sole question posed
to the jury was which medical opinion “sounded more correct”).
177. AseraCare, 938 F.3d at 1288. The court further explained that a “physician’s clinical judgment dictates eligibility as long as it represents a reasonable
interpretation of the relevant medical records.” Id. at 1294.
178. Compare id. at 1288 (noting that each patient’s medical records were supported by “meaningful” documentation), with Druding, 952 F.3d at 94 (describing
the medical records as “incomplete” for some of the patients).

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository,

25

Villanova Law Review, Vol. 67, Iss. 1 [], Art. 5

192

VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
C.

[Vol. 67: p. 167

Objective Falsity: Showing Symptoms of Knowledge

The objective falsity standard may simply be a knowledge analysis disguised as falsity.179 While the Third Circuit acknowledged that the objective falsity standard conflates falsity and knowledge, the Third Circuit
failed to fully examine the extent to which the objective falsity standard is
influenced by knowledge.180 More specifically, the Third Circuit failed to
discern that the three objective falsity scenarios that the Eleventh Circuit
discussed, align with the three types of knowledge statutorily defined in
the FCA.181
The Eleventh Circuit’s first example of objective falsity involved a physician certifying that a patient was terminally ill for Medicare, when in reality, the doctor did not actually believe that the patient had less than six
months to live.182 While the Eleventh Circuit discussed this example in
the context of falsity, it is more relatable to the FCA’s knowledge element,
which requires that a defendant have “actual knowledge” of the false information.183 That is, the doctor in this scenario had actual knowledge that
the patient was not terminally ill despite completing a Medicare certification that indicated otherwise.184
The next objective falsity scenario involved a certifying physician failing to examine a patient’s medical records prior to making a clinical judgment.185 Once again, despite the Eleventh Circuit’s attempt to describe
this example in the context of falsity, it is better aligned with knowledge.186 More specifically, this example is a good representation of the
second type of knowledge which prohibits government agents from acting
179. But see Wood, supra note 133 (explaining how the Third Circuit’s argument that the district court conflated falsity and knowledge is indefensible).
180. See Druding, 952 F.3d at 96 (asserting that the objective falsity standard
conflates knowledge and falsity and supporting that assertion in three small
paragraphs).
181. See id. (missing an opportunity to discuss the three examples of objective
falsity presented by the Eleventh Circuit in AseraCare); 31 U.S.C. § 3729(b)(1)(A)
(defining knowledge requirement as actual knowledge, deliberate ignorance, or
reckless disregard).
182. AseraCare, 938 F.3d at 1297 (spending a small portion of its opinion exemplifying the standard it had just created).
183. See 31 U.S.C. § 3729(b)(1)(A) (presenting the knowledge element of the
FCA).
184. But see Richard Doan, The False Claims Act and the Eroding Scienter in
Healthcare Fraud Litigation, 20 ANNALS HEALTH L. 49, 66 (2011) (“Innocent mistakes, negligent actions, and flawed reasoning are purportedly not actionable
under the FCA.”).
185. AseraCare, 938 F.3d at 1297 (describing examples of objective falsity).
186. See United States v. Hercules, Inc., 929 F. Supp. 1418, 1422–23 (D. Utah
1996) (discussing the House Judiciary Subcommittee’s commentary surrounding
the 1986 FCA amendments that broadened the knowledge element to encompass
not only actual knowledge, but reckless disregard, and deliberate ignorance in an
effort to avoid the “ostrich-with-[their]-head-in-the-sand” problem (internal quotation marks omitted)).
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in “deliberate ignorance of the truth or falsity of the information[.]”187
By not reviewing a patient’s medical records prior to determining that the
patient is terminally ill, there is a good argument to be made that the
physician acted with deliberate ignorance of the information contained in
that patient’s medical records.188
Finally, in its third example, the Eleventh Circuit explained that an
objective falsity may exist when expert evidence shows that no reasonable
physician could have agreed with the certifying physician.189 Once again,
this scenario is more appropriately aligned with the third knowledge category—“reckless disregard.”190 When a physician makes a determination
that no other reasonable physician would have come to, there is a strong
argument to be made that that physician acted with reckless disregard of
the truth.191 While the Eleventh Circuit attempted to fit these examples
in the context of falsity, they neatly fall into the three categories of
knowledge.192
This overlap demonstrates that objective falsity may be less of a falsity
standard and more of a knowledge standard.193 Thus, Druding and other
187. 31 U.S.C. § 3729(b)(1)(A). For a more detailed description of the
knowledge element, see supra Section III.B.1.
188. See generally Doan, supra note 184 (“Proving deliberate ignorance requires evidence that the provider purposely avoided learning of, or blinded itself
to, the falsity of the submitted claims.”).
189. AseraCare, 938 F.3d at 1297 (highlighting three examples of objective falsity and leaving open the possibility that other scenarios could invoke the objective
falsity standard).
190. See 31 U.S.C. § 3729(b)(1)(A); see also MICHAEL P. MATTHEWS & A. JOEL
RICHLIN, WHAT CONSTITUTES “RECKLESS DISREGARD” UNDER THE FCA?, COMPLIANCE
TODAY 22 (2013), https://www.foley.com/-/media/files/insights/publications/
no-date/what-constitutes-reckless-disregard-under-fca/files/what-constitutes-reckless-disregard-under-fca/fileattachment/32013compliancetoday.pdf [https://
perma.cc/LGF3-C7R2] (“Courts have interpreted the reckless disregard standard
as requiring various iterations of ‘extreme’ or ‘aggravated’ gross negligence or
somewhere ‘on a continuum between gross negligence and intentional harm.’ ”);
see generally United States ex rel. K & R Ltd. v. Mass. Hous. Fin. Agency, 530 F.3d
980, 983 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (noting that under the FCA, reckless disregard is an
“extreme version of ordinary negligence” (internal quotation marks omitted)
(quoting United States v. Krizek, 111 F.3d 934, 942 (D.C. Cir. 1997)).
191. See MATTHEWS & RICHLIN, supra note 190, at 25 (identifying the types of
evidence that support a finding of no reckless disregard, one of which is adhering
to industry practice which is an especially strong argument when documented, for
example, in an industry publication); see also United States ex rel. Williams v. Renal
Care Grp., Inc., 696 F.3d 518, 531 (6th Cir. 2012) (holding that the defendants did
not recklessly disregard the truth or falsity of the information for several reasons,
one of which is that the defendant followed industry practices).
192. See generally Doan, supra note 184 (discussing the three categories of FCA
knowledge).
193. See United States ex rel. Trim v. McKean, 31 F. Supp. 2d 1308, 1315 (W.D.
Okla. 1998) (“The gravamen of a false claim focuses on the conduct of the defendant, and inquiries into the defendant’s purpose and intention in filing the requests for payment or reimbursement.” (citing United States v. Krizek, 111 F.3d
934, 939 (D.C. Cir. 1997))).
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cases that examine truthfulness of a clinical judgment appear to focus on
the wrong element.194 That is, Druding should be reviewed in the context
of knowledge, not falsity.195 Centering the analysis on falsity, rather than
knowledge, has resulted in unnecessary confusion and has thwarted the
efforts to adopt a uniform approach to FCA liability.196 Although the
Third Circuit missed an opportunity to explicitly direct the district court
to the knowledge element, the Third Circuit had substantial reason to reverse given that its review was limited to the falsity element.197
VIII. THE SIDE EFFECTS

OF

DRUDING: TREATING
IMBALANCE

THE

FCA LIABILITY

Although the circuit split may be artificial, the resulting confusion is
real and will likely have far-reaching implications.198 As a result of this
uncertainty, health care providers face substantial risk.199 In an attempt
to test the limits of the FCA, opportunistic relators may take advantage of
the lack of clarity in the law by bringing FCA claims against providers for
actions that look less like fraud and more like innocent mistakes.200
Forced to defend themselves in near-frivolous lawsuits, health care providers could face mounting FCA liability.201
194. Compare United States ex rel. Druding v. Care Alts., 952 F.3d 89, 100 (3d
Cir. 2020) (“[W]e find that objectivity speaks to the element of [knowledge], not
falsity.”), with Gregory R. Merz, Supreme Court Declines to Clarify the Standard for Proof
of Falsity Under the False Claims Act, LATHROP GPM (Feb. 25, 2021) https://
www.lathropgpm.com/newsroom-alerts-72627.html [https://perma.cc/2DPT6NLN] (explaining the issue as one of falsity, not one of knowledge).
195. Cf. Winter ex rel. United States v. Gardens Reg’l Hosp. & Med. Ctr., 953
F.3d 1108, 1117 (9th Cir. 2020) (relying on the Supreme Court’s ruling in Escobar,
to explain that the FCA’s rigorous materiality and knowledge elements are sufficient to address concerns of fair notice and open-ended liability).
196. See Druding, 952 F.3d at 100 (acknowledging that when knowledge is
folded into a falsity test, issues arise—namely, the court fails to fully consider evidence of knowledge).
197. See id. at 100–01 (noting that the district court prematurely granted summary judgment and therefore, missed the opportunity to evaluate knowledge).
198. See Matthew Curley & Jeff Gibson, Supreme Court Declines to Weigh in on Key
Falsity Question, JD SUPRA (Feb. 24, 2021), https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/supreme-court-declines-to-weigh-in-on-9450768/ [https://perma.cc/3LQU-3J7A]
(observing the ongoing issues regarding subjective clinical decisions and describing the Supreme Court’s decline to review the Third Circuit’s opinion as a “missed
opportunity”).
199. See id. (noting that allowing hindsight review of a physician’s clinical
opinion poses significant issues for providers).
200. See Drew Newman & Pamela Amaechi, A River Too Far: Extending the False
Claims Act to Subjective Medical Opinions, 26 WESTLAW J. HEALTH CARE FRAUD 01 (July
7, 2020) (examining implications of Druding and observing that “relators may try to
exploit the reasonable differences of physician’s judgement”).
201. See id. (acknowledging “inherit unfairness” of Druding and predicting
that the broad standard adopted by Third Circuit will lead to an increase in FCA
allegations).
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As lower courts attempt to interpret the circuit court’s rulings, health
care providers should anticipate varying applications of the FCA across
jurisdictions.202 Providers practicing in multiple states should strive to stay
up-to-date on whether courts in their jurisdictions require proof of objective falsity in FCA cases.203 While health care providers should be ready to
defend the reasonableness of their clinical judgments, they should not expect to be insulated from FCA liability merely by demonstrating that a
reasonable difference in opinion exists.204
While recent analyses have focused on the falsity element, knowledge
is likely to play a more prominent role in future court opinions.205 As a
result of the Supreme Court declining to review the Third Circuit’s opinion in Druding, health care providers seeking dismissal of a FCA claim may
be compelled to reframe their arguments by focusing less on falsity and
more on knowledge.206 However, this shift could be costly for health care
providers because unlike falsity, knowledge only needs to be alleged generally at the pleading stage.207 Moreover, knowledge can be difficult for
defendants to disprove at the summary judgment phase given that the

202. Cf. Jonathan M. Cohen & Daniel S. Cohen, Iron-ing Out Circuit Splits: A
Proposal for the Use of the Irons Procedure to Prevent and Resolve Circuit Splits Among
United States Courts of Appeals, 103 CALI. L. REV. 989, 996 (June 2020) (examining
the problems that circuit splits yield, one of which is “uncertain and disparate”
applications of the law).
203. See McEvoy, supra note 170 (discussing the options for national employers, one of which is to aggressively file motions in limine aimed at eliminating
conflicting expert opinion).
204. See Lawrence Vernaglia, Alexis Bortniker, Rachel Goodman & Jessa
Boubker, HHS Provider Relief Funds and the Strings and Risks Attached: What Compliance Officers Need to Be Thinking About Now, 22 J. HEALTH CARE COMPLIANCE 5, 5
(2020) (emphasizing the compliance efforts providers must undertake in light of
the “[b]illions of dollars in new revenue streams [that] came into hospitals, health
systems, physician organizations, long-term care facilities, and other players” as a
result of COVID-19).
205. See generally Julia McLetchie, David Bastian & Katie Wellington, Deepening
Circuit Split About Falsity of Medical Opinions Invites a U.S. Supreme Court Decision,
HOGAN LOVELLS (Feb. 9, 2020), https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=
11ef6e6d-48ea-40dc-9edf-13f63c6c8574 [https://perma.cc/36KZ-Q7DJ] (explaining that knowledge may be the next frontier for FCA cases when it comes to evaluating subjective opinion).
206. See id. (noting that the Third Circuit’s decision “may lead defendants to
focus or reframe arguments on the [knowledge] element of the FCA”).
207. See id. (explaining the procedural timing of allegations pertaining to the
knowledge element); cf. Stuart Delery et al., 2020 Mid-Year False Claims Act Update,
GIBSON DUNN (July 17, 2020), https://www.gibsondunn.com/2020-mid-year-falseclaims-act-update/ [https://perma.cc/FZ3P-UZU4] (acknowledging that at pleading stage, knowledge may be alleged generally pursuant to Rule 9(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and that there is no requirement for a specific intent
to defraud under the FCA); see also Winter ex rel. United States v. Gardens Reg’l
Hosp. & Med. Ctr., 953 F.3d 1108, 1122 (discussing knowledge in relation to Rule
9(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure).
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FCA does not require a specific intent to defraud.208 Health care providers involved in a FCA suit may be forced to choose between litigating
through the discovery process, taking their chances at trial, or settling—all
of which result in significant costs.209
In addition, the lack of clarity in the law may stifle innovation and job
opportunities in the medical field.210 Hospitals and provider practices
may be less inclined to put money toward research and development when
faced with a sharp increase in FCA liability, mounting litigation expenses,
and a heightened need to allocate more of their budget toward compliance initiatives.211 Further, health care providers are not only caregivers
in the community, they are also employers.212 As providers search for
ways to cover the increasing costs associated with FCA compliance and
litigation, they may be forced to reduce their payroll expense by laying off
employees.213 In more extreme cases where hospitals or provider practices are already operating on razor-thin margins, higher litigation expenses could mean the difference between serving the public and going
out of business.214
In the wake of Druding, quality and access to health care may decline
as well.215 Out of fear of costly litigation, hospice providers may be overly
208. See McLetchie, supra note 205 (noting that the difficulties of disproving
the knowledge element on summary judgment will “limit FCA defendants’ chances
of obtaining dismissal”).
209. See id. (highlighting the expenses health care providers must consider
even if they are defending themselves against meritless claims).
210. Cf. Regina E. Herzlinger, Why Innovation in Health Care Is So Hard, HARV.
BUS. REV. (May 2006), https://hbr.org/2006/05/why-innovation-in-health-care-isso-hard [https://perma.cc/C3JU-7PDD] (identifying several obstacles to innovation in the industry—most of which relate back to finances).
211. See id. (emphasizing that innovation requires the appropriate funding).
212. See Earlene K.P. Dowell, Health Care Still Largest U.S. Employer: Census Bureau’s 2018 County Business Patterns Provides Data on Over 1,200 Industries, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (Oct. 14, 2020), https://www.census.gov/library/stories/2020/10/
health-care-still-largest-united-states-employer.html [https://perma.cc/R6G3ZSRZ] (identifying that in 2018, the health care sector—the largest employer in
the country—employed more than 20.5 million people).
213. Cf. Ben Teasdale & Kevin A. Shulman, Are U.S. Hospitals Still “Recession
Proof”?, NEW ENG. J. MED. (Sept. 24, 2020), https://www.nejm.org/doi/full/
10.1056/NEJMp2018846 [https://perma.cc/E2QQ-FB2P] (explaining how hospitals are no longer recession proof and estimating that “hospitals will lose $95 billion in annual revenue because of the shift from private to public insurance . . . .”).
Hospitals responded to this impact with layoffs, furloughs, and pay cuts. See id.
214. Cf. id. (examining how the COVID-19 pandemic could exaggerate a hospital’s financial struggles); see also Adrian Diaz, Karan R. Chhabra & John W. Scott,
The COVID-19 Pandemic And Rural Hospitals—Adding Insult To Injury, HEALTHAF(May 2, 2020), https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/foreFAIRS
front.20200429.583513/ [https://perma.cc/XB7S-JRJQ].
215. See Najjar, supra note 5, at 155 (“The Sixth and Tenth Circuits’ broad
readings of the FCA have the potential to chill physicians’ decisions to provide
care to Medicare and Medicaid patients, which in turn, may cause a decline in the
quality and access to healthcare.”).
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conservative when certifying a patient’s terminal illness.216 That conservatism could lead to patients not being able to access palliative care until it is
too late.217 Further, considering that government-sponsored health programs already pay less than private health insurers, providers may refuse to
treat Medicare and Medicaid patients if the FCA liability risk is excessive.218 Given that Medicare and Medicaid primarily cover the elderly, disabled, and poor, an increase in FCA liability could leave the country’s
most vulnerable populations with limited or no access to quality medical
care.219
Due to the high levels of uncertainty in this area of FCA law, now,
perhaps more than at any other time in the FCA’s 150-year history, health
care providers need to prioritize compliance.220 Given the punitive nature of the FCA’s penalties, the multitude of complex statutory and regulatory requirements, as well as the “significant compliance risks and
challenges” associated with COVID-19 relief funds, providers should implement or strengthen their existing compliance programs.221 When developing a robust compliance program, providers should reference the
compliance guidelines created by the Office of the Inspector General
(“OIG”).222 As an example, the OIG recommends that hospices, at a minimum, implement a compliance program with seven features: (1) develop
216. See Cerminara, supra note 32, at 469 (warning that broadening the FCA
could lead to a chilling effect where patients will not have the appropriate access to
hospice services).
217. Cf. id. (explaining how physicians historically approached pain-management conservatively out of fear of prosecutorial and regulatory government
efforts).
218. Compare Eric Lopez, Tricia Neuman, Gretchen Jacobson & Larry Levitt,
How Much More Than Medicare Do Private Insurers Pay? A Review of the Literature, KAISER FAM. FOUND. (Apr. 15, 2020), https://www.kff.org/medicare/issue-brief/howmuch-more-than-medicare-do-private-insurers-pay-a-review-of-the-literature/
[https://perma.cc/R4WS-TSSM] (observing that private insurers pay nearly
double what Medicare pays), with Belanger, supra note 9, at 38 (“It is the rare
provider that can choose to eschew federal dollars and, therefore, the specter of a
FCA case looms large.”).
219. See Najjar, supra note 5, at 157 (noting that the risk of liability may disincentivize physicians from treating Medicaid patients and asserting that this is
“too significant of a risk to place on the nation’s most vulnerable populations”); see
also Vernaglia, supra note 204, at 11 (explaining that HHS has made it clear that it
will be taking efforts to prevent and uncover fraud).
220. See generally Dawkins, supra note 87, at 168 (“[T]he FCA is one of the
strongest antifraud statutes.”).
221. See Vernaglia, supra note 204, at 5 (describing the immense compliance
risks associated with the COVID-19 provider relief funds noting that many “are still
playing catch-up with the documents, commitments, certifications, and other conditions that flew around like snowflakes in a blizzard from March [2020] to July
[2020].”); see generally Cynthia A. Howell, Rough Road Ahead for Businesses?—The
Impact of the Supreme Court’s Ruling in Universal Health Services, v. United States ex rel.
Escobar, 19 DUQ. BUS. L.J. 97, 112–13 (2017) (describing effective internal compliance programs).
222. See Off. of Inspector Gen., Compliance Guidance, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH &
HUM. SERVS., https://oig.hhs.gov/compliance/compliance-guidance/index.asp
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and distribute written standards of conduct, (2) designate a compliance
officer, (3) develop and implement ongoing training, (4) create and
maintain a system so employees may report compliance issues, (5) audit
internally, (6) establish disciplinary mechanisms, and (7) respond
promptly to any detected offenses.223
Druding’s impact is not isolated to the health care sector.224 Any entity receiving government funding is subject to FCA liability.225 Notably,
as the pandemic begins to subside, the 5.2 million businesses that received
COVID-19 relief funding could be subject to FCA liability.226 Unlike
health care providers, many of these businesses do not regularly do business with the government and therefore, are unaware of the FCA’s complexities and significant punitive penalties.227 A business that is
unfamiliar with the FCA may underestimate the need to mitigate FCA exposure at the outset by making compliance a priority, documenting any
mitigation efforts taken, and quickly addressing any mistakes that happen.228 As the novelty of the pandemic wears, the FCA and the legal uncertainty perpetuated by Druding will likely become an area of focus for
courts as those businesses struggle to defend themselves in FCA
proceedings.229
[https://perma.cc/WNP9-NLZU] (last visited Feb. 22, 2022) (providing compliance guidance to various sectors of the health care industry).
223. See OIG Compliance Program, Guidance for Hospices, 64 Fed. Reg.
54,031, 54,034 (Oct. 5, 1999) (recommending seven elements for a hospice’s compliance program).
224. Cf. John Partridge, James Zelenay, Jonathan Phillips, Ryan Bergsieker,
Sean Twomey, Reid Rector, Allison Chapin, Michael Dziuban, Jasper Hicks, Julie
Hamilton & Eva Michaels, 2020 Year-End False Claims Act Update, GIBSON DUNN
(January 27, 2021), https://www.gibsondunn.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/
2020-year-end-false-claims-act-update.pdf [https://perma.cc/PMS4-YPHQ] (explaining that “[d]espite the global pandemic, closed courts, and the realities of
remote work,” the government broke a record in 2020 by bringing more FCA cases
than it ever had before).
225. See generally Newman, supra note 200 (pointing out that Third Circuit’s
opinion is not limited to hospice industry).
226. See McLetchie, supra note 205 (noting that businesses that received
COVID-19 relief funds under the CARES Act face potential FCA liability in the
future if the government can prove the funds were not necessary for the business
to continue its operations).
227. See generally Partridge et. al., supra note 224 (noting that in 2020, health
care FCA cases represented eighty-three percent of total recoveries).
228. See generally Thomas M. Burnett & Daniel G. Murphy, Second Round of
Pandemic Relief Revives Specter of False Claims Act Liabilities for Businesses, REINHART
BOERNER VAN DEUREN S.C. (Dec. 22, 2020), https://www.reinhartlaw.com/knowledge/second-round-of-pandemic-relief-revives-specter-of-false-claims-act-liabilitiesfor-businesses/ [https://perma.cc/48N9-RVKR] (identifying steps businesses can
take to minimize their FCA liability).
229. Cf. id.; Srere, supra note 77 (“While proponents laud the FCA as one of
the most powerful tools in combating healthcare fraud, critics warn against the
unintended consequences of FCA abuse, including costly investigations and litigation that ultimately result in employees and patients footing the bill.”).
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In sum, while Druding provided little guidance for future cases, it did
illuminate a pre-existing condition: Congress, CMS, and the courts have
yet to find the appropriate balance for FCA liability.230 Enforcement of
the FCA is an important tool to safeguard taxpayer dollars; but overenforcement creates undue FCA liability on health care providers and
other entities receiving funding from the government.231 Although a circuit split may not actually exist, the FCA liability imbalance may encourage
Congress to pass legislation addressing the issue, or perhaps, in time, the
Supreme Court will grant certiorari on a future FCA case where the truthfulness of an expert’s opinion is once again questioned.
230. See Deborah R. Farringer, From Guns That Do Not Shoot to Foreign Staplers
Has the Supreme Court’s Materiality Standard Under Escobar Provided Clarity for the
Health Care Industry About Fraud Under the False Claims Act?, 83 BROOK. L. REV. 1227,
1277 (2018) (“Although adoption of a bright line [rule] may have led to arbitrary
results, there does need to be an increased emphasis on assisting government contractors, especially providers and suppliers who participate in federal health care
programs, with a more clearly articulated position on the types of noncompliance
that lie in the mysterious middle of ‘material.’ ”).
231. See generally Christopher Melton, Medical Necessity and False Claims: The
Intersection of Clinical Decisionmaking and Liability, 22 J. HEALTH CARE COMPLIANCE
23, 23 (2020) (cautioning providers to “brace” for FCA liability, largely as a result
of qui tam claims, on top of medical malpractice liability).
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